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Despite recent legislative and administrative efforts, U.S. corporations
continue to engage in a controversial business strategy known as a “corpo-
rate inversion.” A U.S. corporation performing an inversion acquires a for-
eign corporation and then, through a series of complex transactions,
restructures in the foreign corporation’s country. In light of the United
States’ burdensome corporate tax code, the inversion process allows for-
mally American corporations to become taxable as a foreign entity, gener-
ating sizeable tax savings.
It is seldom noticed, however, that the inversion trend raises a significant
corporate law puzzle regarding the misaligned incentives dividing directors
and shareholders. From a corporate director’s point of view, inversions are
particularly attractive. This is because the process can be structured to re-
duce a company’s tax rate while also lessening management’s duty to com-
ply with costly regulatory frameworks. For instance, inverted companies
often reincorporate in countries with more management-friendly corporate
governance statutes. Likewise, since U.S. exchanges subject foreign incor-
porated companies to less scrutinizing securities regulations, the inversion
process can allow publicly traded companies to minimize costly disclosure,
auditing, and corporate governance requirements.
But critically, inversions are puzzling from an investor’s or share-
holder’s perspective. Since corporate regulations are generally thought to
protect investors, why would an individual invest in a company that has
deliberately sought out and reincorporated in a country that provides mini-
mal shareholder protections? In fact, shareholders often vote in favor of,
and thus authorize, the very transactions that limit their ability to acquire
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information and enforce other shareholder rights. So why is the corporate
migration trend booming if individuals should disfavor investing in in-
verted companies and shareholders should refuse to authorize them? Do
individuals value the law? Using an original dataset and empirical analysis,
this Article explores why individuals appear to ignore something as impor-
tant—and as valuable—as the law.
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INTRODUCTION
AA corporate inversion is an increasingly popular and controver-sial business strategy used by U.S. corporations to reorganize asa foreign entity.1 When a U.S. corporation performs an inversion
it acquires a foreign corporation and then, through a series of complex
transactions, reincorporates in the foreign corporation’s country.2 The
process is called an inversion because the acquiring company adopts the
1. See, e.g., Jeff Sommer, A Tax-Cutting Move That Pfizer Can Hardly Resist, N.Y.




2. See generally Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regula-
tory Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1672-1699 (2015) (providing an excellent overall
discussion of the corporate inversion process).
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target company’s corporate identity in reverse of the usual process.3 And
since inversions seldom require a change of physical location, the U.S.
offices, assets, and employees of inverted firms typically remain located
in the United States.4
The common explanation for the inversion trend is simple: U.S. compa-
nies would like to pay fewer taxes.5 The United States subjects American
corporations to a notoriously burdensome tax code, including the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) highest
corporate tax rate, as well as worldwide taxation.6 This latter feature
taxes a U.S. corporation’s entire global revenue stream, whereas most
nations tax only what is earned inside their territorial borders.7 By in-
verting into a foreign entity, former U.S. corporations can escape impor-
tant aspects of the U.S. tax code, generating sizeable tax savings.
Perhaps the most notable 2015 inversion was Pfizer’s failed $150 billion
acquisition of Allergan, which the Treasury scuttled in 2016.8 An
abridged list of inversions taking place in 2015 includes Medtronic’s
nearly $50 billion inversion with Covidien,9 Coca-Cola Enterprises’s ac-
quisition of Iberian and German Coca-Cola bottling companies,10 and
CF–OCI’s $8 billion merger.11 Johnson also announced that it intends to
purchase and invert with Tyco not more than a few weeks into 2016; the
surviving company is slated to become an Irish corporation named John-
3. See Lindsay Holst, What Are “Inversions,” and Why Should You Care?, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (July 24, 2014, 2:43 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/07/24/what-
are-inversions-and-why-should-you-care [https://perma.cc/5TCA-DBQX] (defining an in-
version as occurring when “a U.S.-based multinational with operations in other countries
restructures itself so that the U.S. ‘parent’ is replaced by a foreign corporation—and usu-
ally one that’s in a country with a lower tax rate than the United States”).
4. See Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based Multinational Businesses: Ana-
lyzing the Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 551, 555 (2003) (explaining that in an inversion “the corporate structure is
basically turned upside down, with the newly-created foreign corporation becoming the
parent. . . and the former domestic parent becoming a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corpora-
tion. Hence, the term ‘inversion.’”).
5. See Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International
Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2008) (noting that corporate inver-
sions are “unabashedly all about tax reduction”).
6. See Michael S. Knoll, The Corporate Income Tax and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Industries, 63 TAX L. REV 771, 771-72 (2010) (stating that the only corporate tax rate
higher than the United States is in Japan, though Japan has since lowered its tax rate).
7. See James R. Hines, Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income, 62 TAX L.
REV. 269, 270 (2009).
8. Stephen Gandel, Why New Tax Inversion Rules Won’t Stop Pfizer-Allergan Deal,
FORTUNE (Nov. 20, 2015, 3:42 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/11/20/why-new-tax-inversion-
rules-wont-stop-pfizer-allergan-deal/ [https://perma.cc/2EDP-K2W6].
9. See David Crow, Medtronic: the tax inversion that got away, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27,
2015, 11:20 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ddcd9ad6-a5cf-11e4-ad35-
00144feab7de.html.
10. Arash Massoudi & Lindsay Whipp, Coca-Cola bottlers agree three-way Europe
merger, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015, 12:09 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/10fd9c9e-3c2a-
11e5-bbd1-b37bc06f590c.html.
11. Ilan Brat, Fertilizer Maker CF to Buy Assets of Dutch Rival for $8 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cf-industries-to-merge-with-parts-of-oci-
1438858580.
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son Controls PLC.12
But as the inversion trend grows, so has the backlash against it.13 The
problem is that inverted companies benefit from American laws and ser-
vices while eroding the U.S. tax base at the same time.14 Corporate inver-
sions also transfer capital abroad—almost $2.1 trillion worth15—where
foreign nations can potentially gain the advantages of research and devel-
opment, intellectual property innovation, and human capital growth.16
These negative effects have inspired boycott calls of tax-dodging U.S.
12. Bob Tita and Dana Mattioli, Johnson Controls, Tyco to Merge in Inversion Deal,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/johnson-controls-tyco-to-merge-in-
inversion-deal-1453724828?mg=ID-wsj [https://perma.cc/58BF-KE7F].
13. See, e.g., Shane Zahrt, Ending Corporate Inversions: Past Failures, Continued Con-
troversy and Proposals for Reform, 41 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 1591, 1593 (2015) (af-
ter remarking that inversions are “exceedingly unpopular with the American public,” the
author offers solutions to prevent corporate inversions); Overseas ‘tax inversions’ are unpa-
triotic: Obama, N.Y. Post (July 26, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/07/26/overseas-
tax-inversions-are-unpatriotic-obama/ [https://perma.cc/6KHS-LU6K]. Others commenta-
tors assert that migrating companies are only acting rationally. The argument follows that
American companies would remain incorporated in the U.S. if the corporate tax rate were
lowered to a competitive level. See Joe Kennedy, Behind the Foreign Shopping Spree for
U.S. Companies, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB11760718815427544683404581068100290305890 [https://perma.cc/J624-6AYB] (“The
Business Round Table and Ernst & Young have calculated that the U.S. lost $179 billion in
assets of U.S.-based companies over the last decade through foreign acquisitions. If the top
corporate rate had been lowered to 25% from 35% a decade ago, they estimate there
would be 1,300 more U.S.-based companies today.”). This camp also notes that assigning
moral blame to migrating companies is unfair; so long as the United States orchestrates
ways to tax the greatest amount possible—by, for instance, taxing internationally gener-
ated profits—it is fair game for companies to explore legal measures to reduce their tax
burdens. Judge Learned Hand once noted that individuals are “not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury. . .” Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d
Cir. 1934), “[T]here is nothing sinister in so arranging affairs to keep taxes as low as possi-
ble.” C.I.R. v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947).
14. See, e.g., Richard Trumka, Let’s Call ‘Corporate Inversion” What It Is: A Gaping,
Unpatriotic Tax Loophole, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-trumka/lets-call-corporate-inver_b_5629936.html [https://
perma.cc/23RP-2M9L] (arguing that companies are benefiting from “our legal system to
protect their investments and patents, our education and training system to train their
workers, our transportation system to get their products to market, our federally sponsored
research, our military—but they want the rest of us to front their share of the bill”).
15. Richard Rubin, U.S. Companies Are Stashing $2.1 Trillion Overseas to Avoid
Taxes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Mar. 4 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-03-04/u-s-companies-are-stashing-2-1-trillion-overseas-to-avoid-taxes [https://
perma.cc/6KA9-AKGJ].
16. These additional negative externalities are perhaps more likely and more severe
when an inverting corporation decides to relocate its headquarters abroad as well. See
Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13
(2015) (“There are several benefits in having a corporate headquarters located within a
jurisdiction. For example, the national pride associated with having a well-known corpora-
tion headquartered within a jurisdiction may produce certain political benefits. In addition,
a firm’s headquarters may bring with it job creation and capital expenditure, resulting in
positive economic effects in the jurisdiction in which the headquarters operate. Headquar-
ters are also likely to ‘generate learning and innovation, since research, development, and
entrepreneurial activities’ happen within corporate headquarters.”).
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companies,17 President Obama described inversions as “unpatriotic”18
and the Daily Show’s Jon Stewart warned of the “Inversion of the Money
Snatchers.”19 Even the typically immobile federal government has
promulgated a series of rules and regulations aimed at impeding the rate
of new inversions.20
But despite the attention inversions receive, few have noticed that this
trend raises a significant corporate law puzzle concerning the misaligned
incentives dividing directors and shareholders.21 From a director’s stand-
point, inversions are quite appealing for reasons beyond reducing corpo-
rate taxes. Principally, a company’s leadership may structure an inversion
to diminish management’s duty to comply with a number of burdensome
corporate regulations. For instance, because U.S. securities laws are less
demanding of foreign private issuers than U.S. corporations, a publicly
traded company can structure an inversion to avoid costly disclosure, au-
diting, and corporate governance requirements.22 Inverted companies
may also reincorporate in jurisdictions with more management-friendly
corporate governance laws, neutralizing shareholder lawsuits, disclosure
requirements, and external scrutiny.23 In this context, inverting gives cor-
porate directors the perfect opportunity to escape the United States’ on-
erous regulatory system.24
However, the inversion trend is quite puzzling from a shareholder’s
perspective. This is because corporate regulations are generally thought
17. See Renu Zaretsky, A Burger King Boycott? Senator takes a stand against corpo-
rate inversions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/Busi-
ness/Tax-VOX/2014/0902/A-Burger-King-boycott-Senator-takes-a-stand-against-
corporate-inversions.
18. Overseas ‘tax inversions’ are unpatriotic: Obama, N.Y. POST (July 26, 2014, 6:30
AM), http://nypost.com/2014/07/26/overseas-tax-inversions-are-unpatriotic-obama [https://
perma.cc/6KHS-LU6K].
19. Inversion of the Money Snatchers, DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (July 30,
2014), http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/ehvwjx/inversion-of-the-money-snatchers [https://
perma.cc/5AHX-Y9KB].
20. See Arash Massoudi & James Fontanella-Khan, US companies regain their appetite
for tax inversion deals, FIN. TIMES (June 15, 2015, 10:03 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
0/da02654e-12ad-11e5-8cd7-00144feabdc0.html.
21. Because shareholders have limited managerial rights, shareholders must depend
upon directors and officers to advance their ownership interests; but at times, management
harbors diverging interests from shareholders. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW, at 557-58 (8th ed. 2010) (explaining that ownership rights and manage-
ment rights are separated in American corporate law, giving shareholders few opportuni-
ties to operate the day-to-day operations of a company).
22. See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV.
89, 130 (2007) (noting that foreign private issuers are classified under a different securities
regime from American companies, requiring diminished disclosure requirements among
other regulations).
23. Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Eco-
nomic Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 314 (2004) (“The conversion of a U.S. based
multinational into a foreign corporation not only alters the tax exposure of the corporate
group, but also changes the laws that govern intra-corporate relations.”).
24. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-
Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 938-42 (2012) (noting that Nevada has sought to
attract companies away from Delaware by eliminating director liability; the theory is that
directors prefer jurisdictions where the costs of regulation are minimal).
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to protect shareholders and investors.25 Consider corporate governance
laws; under almost all American corporate governance statutes, directors
of U.S. corporations owe fiduciary duties to their shareholders, which
shareholders may sue to enforce.26 Likewise, securities regulations re-
quire U.S. corporations to make regular disclosures that firms might oth-
erwise choose to conceal from investors.27 So why would an individual
invest in a company that has deliberately sought out and reincorporated
in a country that poorly protects investors?28 In fact, since inverting re-
quires shareholder approval,29 why would shareholders vote in favor of—
and thus authorize—the very transactions that limit their ability to ac-
quire information and enforce other shareholder rights?30 On the surface,
it makes little sense why investors would ignore something as important,
and as valuable, as the law.
The puzzling mindset and behaviors of investors is a recurring topic in
legal scholarship.31 It was long believed that investors were “rational,”
meaning that they thoughtfully consider all aspects of a company before
investing.32 This theory has fallen out of favor in lieu of a behavioral eco-
nomics approach, which suggests that investors act in flawed and capri-
cious manners.33 Although investors should value the law, they suffer
25. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionaliza-
tion of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025 (2009) (“The Securities and Exchange
Commission thinks of itself as the investors’ advocate.”).
26. See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239,
243 (2009) (referring to fiduciary duties as a corporate governance tool meant to protect
shareholder interests).
27. The SEC considers itself the advocate and protector of common investors. See
What We Do, U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
[https://perma.cc/9AMC-GGM6].
28. See infra Section II (describing a series of Mylan transactions posing substantial
questions about why shareholders consent to inversions).
29. Shareholders must almost always approve an inversion since an inversion requires
a merger. For instance, Delaware laws require a board of directors that seeks to merge with
another company to put the proposed merger to a vote of the shareholders. 8 Del C. § 251
(c).
30. Kun, supra note 23, at 364-65; see also Kane & Rock, supra note 5, at 1236 (noting
that the simplest way to reincorporate in another jurisdiction is through a shareholder
vote).
31. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regula-
tion: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992). See also Barbara Black,
Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Reasonable Investors, Efficient Markets, 44
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1493, 1493-97 (2013) (discussing the use of investor behavior theories in
securities litigation); Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public
Offerings, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85 (2006) (explaining the use of behavioral econom-
ics in SEC regulations).
32. Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 467 (2015) (“[T]he
reasonable investor is generally understood to be the idealized, perfectly rational actor of
neoclassical economics. The reasonable investor is presumed to operate rationally to maxi-
mize returns in the marketplace. Prior to making investment decisions, the reasonable in-
vestor is capable of reading and comprehending all the noise and signals in the
marketplace that encapsulate formal disclosures, economic data, market trends, senseless
speculation, and irresponsible rumors. As such, when given the requisite information, rea-
sonable investors are able to properly price the risks and rewards of an investment.”).
33. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP L. 455, 471-72 (2006) (explaining the emergence of the behav-
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from any number of cognitive disabilities limiting their capacity to make
wise decisions.34 If this latter theory is correct, individuals might be in-
vesting in inverted companies because investors are, well, irrational.
Using empirical analyses and an original dataset, this Article tests these
competing theories to determine whether investors and shareholders
comprehend the potential dangers of inverting. The first hypothesis
comes from behavioral economics: while investors should be skeptical of
companies that structure inversions to dismantle shareholder protections,
anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals irrationally ignore such dan-
gers.35 The second hypothesis asserts that the complicated and poorly un-
derstood nature of inversions has created an illusion of illogical investing.
After accounting for an inversion’s many intricate parts, it may become
apparent that investors deftly grasp the regulatory consequences of in-
verting. It could be that the benefits of a lower corporate tax rate outpace
the potential harms of inverting. By statistically untangling the complex-
ity of deal work, the following research explores how directors and share-
holders interact when structuring an inversion.
In terms of contributions, this Article seeks to advance the inversion
literature, which has developed slowly despite this transaction’s popular-
ity.36 Indeed, considering the obvious advantages of lowering a com-
pany’s corporate tax rate, few have questioned why U.S. corporations
pursue inverting. But this view ignores that corporations are comprised of
heterogeneous actors—including directors, officers, and shareholders,
who sometimes harbor diverging preferences.37 By treating inversions as
an interaction between potentially adverse parties, this Article is likely
the first to question why shareholders and investors support inversions. In
doing so, the empirical analysis arrives at a fairly surprising conclusion: in
contrast to most contemporary theories explaining investor behaviors, the
shareholders involved in inversions generally understand the conse-
quences of modifying corporate regulations. It seems sophisticated insti-
tutional investors play such a predominant leadership role in large
corporate transactions that corporate directors must orchestrate inver-
sions in a manner accounting for, and advancing, shareholder rights and
preferences.
ioral finance theories relative to the historical dominance of the efficient market
hypothesis).
34. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (“Not all investors are rational. Quite apart from the obvious
examples of credulity in the face of the latest Ponzi scheme, there is no shortage of evi-
dence that many investors’ decisions are influenced by systematic biases that impair their
abilities to maximize their investment returns.”).
35. See infra Section II (using Mylan’s example to illustrate the dangers potentially
facing shareholders).
36. See Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration; Tax Diversion through Inver-
sion, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 812 (2015) (describing inversions as “under-explored”).
37. See Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18
GEO. MASON L. REV. 833 (2011) (remarking that “[c]orporate governance law addresses
the misaligned incentives between officers and directors of publicly owned companies and
their shareholders and how this can lead to the destruction of shareholder value”).
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In addition, understanding how investors approach inversions sheds
valuable light on the debate between traditional and behavioral econom-
ics. In light of this Article’s results, the question should be not be about
which theory is superior,38 but rather about how scholars can use both
approaches to explain investor phenomena. After all, considering that in-
vestors tend to favor inverting in strong regulatory climates, this raises
questions about how and why some companies are still able to consum-
mate value-stripping transactions. This Article finds that while traditional
economics has greater explanatory power, behavioral economics makes
sense out of anomalous observations. Thus, the following research helps
to lay a foundation for integrating modern behavioral economics theories
with more orthodox rationality work.
The statistical analysis also provides insight into the international com-
petition for corporate charters. Corporate charters exist in an interna-
tional market whereby countries promote their national business and
corporate laws to attract wayward firms.39 How this competition is
waged, though, likely foreshadows the evolution and direction of corpo-
rate law.40 If investors care little about the law, then firms will migrate to,
and reincorporate in, whichever countries offer the lowest tax rates, re-
laxed securities regulations, and management-friendly corporate govern-
ance laws.41 But if investors actively prefer, and demand, strong legal
systems, countries will respond with meaningful corporate statutes.42 The
ensuing statistical analysis therefore helps to explain whether interna-
tional corporate law is likely to develop as a race to the top or bottom.43
This Article proceeds in four parts. Section I overviews the typical in-
version transaction and the laws governing it. Section II illustrates with a
case study the ways in which inverting can empower corporate directors
while harming shareholders. In this example, Mylan’s shareholders might
have decided to reject the company’s Dutch inversion plans had they ap-
preciated the transaction’s dangers. Section III sheds light on why indi-
viduals invest in inversions, as well as why investors authorize them by
38. See, e.g., Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, The Empty Promise of Behavioral Anti-
trust, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 1009, 1023, 1052 (2014) (arguing that the inability of
behavioral economics to advance antitrust scholarship is because behavioral economics
lacks the rigors and explanatory power of traditional economics, and stating that its “tools
are simply a patchwork of observed anomalies that behavioral scholars have not shown to
be systemic in the field of industrial organization”).
39. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2010) (noting
that countries seek to attract companies using their legal regimes as a commodity).
40. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002)
(discussing the competition over corporate charters and the significance of whether this
competition is a race to the “top or the bottom”).
41. See Jason M. Quintana, Going Private Transactions: Delaware’s Race to the Bot-
tom?, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 547, 552-55 (2004) (explaining the “race to the top”
versus “race to the bottom” debate, and how it influences behavior).
42. See Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1726
(2006) (“As long as corporate decisionmakers prefer laws that maximize the value of the
firm, jurisdictions will offer such laws.”).
43. See Quintana, supra note 41, at 552-55.
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discussing the ways that investors cognize and respond to legal considera-
tions. Section IV adds nuance and detail to international transactional
work by explaining the regulatory decisions firms must consider when
venturing beyond their country’s borders—including corporate govern-
ance, tax, securities, and antitrust laws. Section V empirically examines
investor behaviors in light of the various regulatory-adding or stripping
transactions that publicly traded companies make. This study investigates
whether investors and shareholders approach inversions irrationally or
with thought and sophistication. To conclude, Section VI discusses the
implications and potential policies of the statistical research.
I. THE CORPORATE INVERSION
Companies primarily cite the United States’ tax code as their reason
for inverting.44 As previously stated, the United States imposes the devel-
oped world’s highest corporate tax rate.45 The United States is also one of
the few countries to employ a worldwide taxation system,46 subjecting a
U.S. corporation’s entire global income stream to American taxation.47
Without worldwide taxation, foreign entities would not only enjoy their
home country’s lower tax rates but could also generate additional tax sav-
ings by transferring internationally generated revenue into even more le-
nient tax havens.48 These tax benefits are likely enough motivation for
multinational U.S. corporations to relocate abroad, but as will be ex-
plained, incorporating abroad for foreign tax treatment is often difficult,
costly, and sometimes impossible.
The U.S. government has promulgated several measures intended to
prevent U.S. corporations from migrating abroad for tax purposes, most
notably Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)49 and two IRS
notices issued in 2014 and 2015, respectively.50 During the 1980s and
1990s, a first wave of companies sought to lower their tax rates by rein-
44. See generally Talley, supra note 2.
45. Brian Dumaine, The five countries with the highest corporate tax rate, FORTUNE
(Nov. 21, 2014, 6:01 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/21/the-five-countries-with-the-high-
est-corporate-tax-rates/ (finding that the U.S. corporate tax rate can effectively be up to
40% when adding state taxes to the equation).
46. See Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals May Be
Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (And Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 59 SMU L.
REV. 751 (2006) (“The United States taxes domestic corporations on their worldwide in-
comes, with credit for foreign income taxes, but it only taxes foreign corporations on in-
come from U.S. sources and on income effectively connected with U.S. trades or
businesses.”).
47. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4); Kun, supra note 23, at 333 (“The United States has a
worldwide tax system that taxes domestic corporations on income generated in the United
States and abroad.”).
48. See Joshua Simpson, Analyzing Corporate Inversions and Proposed Changes to the
Repatriation Rule, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 673, 674 (2013); see also Liz Hoffman,
The Tax Inversion Wave Keeps Rolling, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2015, 7:05 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/horizon-pharma-at-the-nexus-of-taxes-and-deals-1436296946?
mg=ID-wsj.
49. I.R.C. § 7874 (2016).
50. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52 (Sept. 22, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 2015-79 (Nov. 19, 2015).
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corporating in tax havens51 because the U.S. tax code established a com-
pany’s tax status by its place of incorporation.52 Due to the audacity of
these naked tax-avoidance transactions, in 2004, Congress enacted Sec-
tion 7874 as part of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act),
increasing the difficulty of becoming a taxable foreign entity.53
Under Section 7874, a U.S. corporation pursuing foreign tax treatment
was required to execute a corporate inversion (also known as a “tax in-
version”), which entailed acquiring and merging with a foreign com-
pany.54 For an inversion to be successful, Section 7874 placed strict
limitations on the surviving entity’s common ownership with its former
U.S. corporation, otherwise known as “ownership continuity.”55 If less
than 60% of the U.S. company’s shareholders carried over to the new
corporation, the newly inverted company would receive foreign tax treat-
ment.56 If the newly inverted entity had more than an 80% ownership
continuity with its old U.S. corporation, the inverted firm would remain
subject to the U.S. tax code as a U.S. corporation.57 Most inverted firms
fit the third category in which the inverted entity’s common ownership
falls between 60% and 80%. While this category of inversion is consid-
ered successful, the company suffers negative tax consequences for a pe-
riod of ten years.58 Upon satisfying either of § 7874’s 60% or 80%
thresholds, an inverted corporation not only becomes a foreign entity for
U.S. tax purposes but also assumes the acquired entity’s corporate iden-
tity. However, there was one exception to Section 7874. A company that
has “substantial business activities” in another country could invert in
that country without penalty, regardless of its ownership continuity.59
Whether a company has substantial business activity is determined by the
twenty-five percent test:60 25% of the company’s employees, asset value,
total income, and employee compensation must be located in or attribu-
51. See Hwang, supra note 36, at 821-23.
52. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2016).
53. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004);
see Tyler M. Dumler, Charging Less to Make More: The Causes and Effects of the Corpo-
rate Inversion Trend in the U.S. and the Implications of Lowering the Corporate Tax Rate,
13 U.C. DAVIS. BUS. L.J. 88 (2012).
54. See Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture The Rising Tax-Electivity of
U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 377-78 (2011) (“Once a company is incor-
porated in the United States, however, escaping its status as a U.S. resident is difficult. It
may require genuinely being purchased by new owners, such as a private equity fund or
else a distinct foreign company with its own shareholders and managers.”).
55. Talley, supra note 2, at 1677.
56. Id.
57. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B), (b) (2016); Talley, supra note 2, at 1677.
58. I.R.C. § 7874(d); Hwang, supra note 36, at 830 (“If ownership continuity is be-
tween 60% and 80%, Section 7874 . . . restricts the inverter in some way—for instance, by
limiting the inverter’s use of certain tax attributes to offset gains in the years after the
inversion. In addition, the inverting corporation’s ability to use net operating losses to re-
duce taxation of its inversion gain is limited.”).
59. Hwang, supra note 36, at 830; see generally Joseph A. Tootle, The Regulation of
Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business Activities”, 33 VA. TAX  REV. 353 (2013).
60. See Hwang, supra note 36, at 830.
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table to its inversion country.61
Despite Section 7874’s 80% threshold, a number of U.S. companies
have still been able to invert, prompting the IRS to issue its 2014 Notice,
which made inversions even less profitable and harder to accomplish.62
The Notice added two principal anti-inversion measures, the first of
which strengthened Section 7874’s 80% threshold.63 Previously, corpora-
tions concocted ways to satisfy the 80% threshold’s letter but not necessa-
rily its spirit. By paying “skinny down dividends,” otherwise known as
extraordinary dividends, U.S. corporations were able to reduce their asset
totals to fall below the 80% level.64 The 2014 Notice, however, informed
U.S. corporations that the Treasury would ignore extraordinary divi-
dends, making the 80% threshold harder to achieve.65 The flipside of the
skinny down was the “cash box,” in which a foreign target company
would account for assets that were absent from its regular business rou-
tine.66 This tax strategy helped target companies surpass the 20% require-
ment (whereas inverting U.S. corporations must get below the 80%
barrier) until the IRS announced with the 2014 Notice that it would ig-
nore assets in a firm’s accounting when more than 50% of the assets were
passive.67 In 2015, the IRS further clarified this rule, stating that any as-
sets “stuffed” into a foreign corporation with the sole intent of satisfying
the 20% threshold would be disregarded.68
The second measure within the 2014 Notice sought to eliminate a sub-
stantial non-tax benefit enjoyed by most inverted firms regarding foreign
held capital. Because repatriating foreign-generated capital into the
United States is typically a taxed transaction, U.S. corporations have long
sought for ways to transfer foreign funds into the United States without
paying the U.S. 35% corporate tax rate.69 Before the 2014 IRS Notice, an
61. Id.
62. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52 (Sept. 22, 2014); Dumler, supra note 53, at 95.
63. See I.R.C. § 7874. In addition, Subpart F seeks to limit the profitability of certain
inversions. If a foreign corporation is owned by more than a majority of American share-
holders, Subpart F allows the U.S. government to tax certain unrepatriated income. Simp-
son, supra note 48, at 681.
64. Zahrt, supra note 13, at 1608. (quoting Press Release, Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact
Sheet: Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions (Sept. 22, 2014), https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2645.aspx).





68. See Fact Sheet: Additional Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions
(Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0281.aspx
[https://perma.cc/E928-XH8L].
69. I.R.C. § 952 (2016); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF
INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY
STUDY, ix (2000), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/sub-
partf.pdf; John T. VanDenburgh, Closing International Loopholes: Changing the Corporate
Tax Base to Effectively Combat Tax Avoidance, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 313, 330 (2012)
(“Earnings Stripping is a tax avoidance technique in which a U.S. corporation sets up a
subsidiary in a low-tax country, and then the U.S. corporation uses its U.S. earnings and
makes deductible payments to the subsidiary in the form of interest, royalties, or fees.”).
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inverted company could access foreign capital, free of U.S. taxation, by
having a subsidiary make loans or other non-payment transfers to its for-
eign parent company—after all, an inverted firm becomes a foreign entity
upon completion of the inversion process.70 Therefore, an inverted firm
could access foreign-held capital, whereas a U.S. corporation could not,
by virtue of being reorganized abroad. This process became known as the
“hopscotch loan.”71 Other types of earnings-stripping or income-shifting
transactions included fee payments, licensing deals, and rentals.72 This
practice lasted until 2014 when the Treasury Notice announced that the
IRS would consider hopscotch loans to be taxable dividends.73
After even more companies inverted in late 2015, including Pfizer and
Allergan’s announced, but ultimately unsuccessful record breaking $160
billion acquisition,74 the Treasury sought to further frustrate corporate
migrations by limiting the countries in which a firm could invert. Previ-
ously, companies pursuing an inversion were largely unrestricted in
choosing where to reincorporate.75 In selecting an inversion home, a U.S.
corporation would have only to merge with two companies, the first being
its primary foreign target company and the other a shell company incor-
porated in the inverting company’s desired corporate home. So long as
the inversion’s total transaction satisfied Section 7874, the combination’s
surviving entity could assume the shell company’s corporate identity.76
However, the 2015 IRS Notice ended this practice by requiring inverted
firms to relocate to their primary merger partner’s country of incorpora-
70. See I.R.C. § 956(c)(1)(C) (2016); 26 C.F.R. § 1.956-2(a)(1)(iii) (2016); see also
Hwang, supra note 36, at 818 (“Prior to the Notice, domestic corporations that received
loans from their controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) had to treat the loans as if the
money had been repatriated to the United States as a dividend, and therefore had to pay
taxes on that dividend.”).
71. See generally Mike Patton, Will U.S. Government Succeed In Closing This Corpo-
rate Tax Loophole?, FORBES.COM (Sept. 25, 2014, 11:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
mikepatton/2014/09/25/congress-attempts-to-close-corporate-tax-loophole/.
72. See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et. al., Getting Serious About Cross-Border
Earnings Stripping: Establishing An Analytical Framework, 93 N.C. L. REV. 673, 673-74
(2015); Kun, supra note 23, at 338; Hwang, supra note 36, at 818 (“Using a hopscotch loan,
a corporation avoids those taxes by causing a CFC to make a loan to the domestic corpora-
tion’s new foreign parent company, rather than to the domestic corporation directly. The
promised regulations eliminate the benefits of hopscotch loans by making these loans sub-
ject to the same tax that would be owed if the CFC had made the loan directly to the
domestic corporation.”).
73. See Hwang, supra note 36, at 818.
74. Antoine Gara, Pfizer’s Tax Inversion Isn’t A Miracle Drug: Just Ask Monsanto
And Towers Watson, FORBES.COM (Nov. 24, 2015, 2:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
antoinegara/2015/11/24/pfizers-tax-inversion-isnt-a-miracle-drug-just-ask-monsanto-and-
towers-watson/.
75. For example, before the 2015 IRS notice Mylan, a Pennsylvania corporation, was
able to invert into a Dutch entity after merging with Abbott Laboratories, which was for-
mally a Michigan corporation. Mylan executed the transaction by establishing a Dutch
Shell corporation which was included, as a third party vehicle, into Mylan and Abbott’s
acquisition. This transaction structure allowed the new inverted Mylan to remerge as a
Dutch corporation. New Moon B.V., Amendment No. 1 to Form S-4 Registration State-
ment (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1623613/
000119312514437795/d813963ds4a.htm.
76. See id.
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tion, thereby nullifying the shell company’s efficacy.77 This Notice frus-
trated several proposed inversions, including the CF/OCI acquisition,
which had sought to become a United Kingdom corporation, but must
now incorporate in the Netherlands.78
Although Section 7874 and the Treasury Notices were initially meant to
halt most future inversions, the practical effect has only limited the avail-
ability of plausible inversion countries and partners, making these trans-
actions harder to complete.79 After all, acquirers must now find such a
specifically structured foreign target company that the surviving entity
may satisfy either Section 7874’s 60% or 80% requirements. Neverthe-
less, many corporations with large overseas business segments still find
inverting worthwhile, especially since the process can loosen other regu-
latory burdens such as securities, corporate governance, and antitrust re-
quirements.80 With this in mind, the next Section examines how these
regulatory-stripping transactions occurring during an inversion poten-
tially harm shareholders while empowering directors.
II. SHAREHOLDERS VERSUS MANAGEMENT, AND THE
CORPORATE INVERSION: A CASE STUDY OF MYLAN’S
STRANGE INTERNATIONAL JOURNEY
The manner in which Mylan N.V. survived rival Teva’s hostile takeover
attempt illustrates two related points about inversions. The first is that
corporate inversions implicate a fundamental problem of corporate law:
corporate directors sometimes take actions serving their own preferences,
despite owing fiduciary duties to act in their shareholders’ best inter-
ests.81 In the inversion context, even though corporate regulations are
meant to protect investors and shareholders,82 some directors favor in-
verting in countries that lack safeguards on par with U.S. regulations, po-
tentially putting directors in conflict with their shareholders.83 In this
case, Mylan’s directors stripped its shareholders of rights and protections
found under Pennsylvania law when they inverted the company into a
77. Fact Sheet: Additional Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions (Nov.
19, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0281.aspx.
78. Lisa Beilfuss & Marie Beaudette, CF, OCI Amend Merger Agreement to Keep ‘In-
version’ Tax Benefit, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2015 9:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cf-
oci-to-move-tax-residency-to-netherlands-1450704668.
79. See Shayndi Raice & Dana Mattioli, Inversion Deals Retain Their Allure, WALL
ST. J. (Aug 6. 2015, 9:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/inversion-deals-retain-their-al-
lure-1438910884 (finding that the rate of companies inverting is increasing despite a tempo-
rary lull from regulatory changes).
80. See Section IV for a thorough analysis.
81. See Waller, supra note 37, at 833-34 (explaining that corporate law statutes are
designed, in large part, to solve the problem posed when “managers and directors of large
corporations often act in their own best interests rather than the best interests of the share-
holders, who are the real owners of the company”).
82. See POSNER, supra note 21, at 557-58 (discussing the possibility that the interests of
directors and shareholders may diverge).
83. See Kane & Rock, supra note 5, at 1241 (explaining that “distortions to the market
for corporate charters may arise where securing the tax surplus requires a corporation to
locate in a suboptimal jurisdiction for corporate law purposes”).
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Dutch corporation.84 When Mylan’s rival Teva sought to acquire Mylan,
many Mylan shareholders preferred selling the company while Mylan’s
directors—likely fearing for their board positions—rejected Teva’s bid.85
Mylan’s shareholders found themselves powerless to contest the Board’s
actions and the ensuing destruction of shareholder value. These events
triggered important questions concerning the possible reasons why My-
lan’s shareholders consented to such a self-defeating transaction.86 Is My-
lan an anomalous situation or representative of most corporate
inversions?
As background, Mylan, Inc. was originally headquartered and incorpo-
rated in West Virginia (Old Mylan).87 In 2014, Old Mylan inverted, merg-
ing with the Japanese and French business segments (the Business) of
Abbott Laboratories (Abbott Labs).88 Right before purchasing Abbott
Labs, Old Mylan organized two subsidiary corporations—New Moon
B.V., a Dutch entity, and Moon of PA, a Pennsylvania corporation—to
serve as vehicles for Mylan’s Dutch reincorporation.89 The transaction
required Old Mylan’s shareholders to approve inverting, which they did
overwhelmingly, so that New Moon could acquire Abbott Labs’ Business,
Old Mylan, and Moon of PA, the latter two entities ceasing to exist.90 The
surviving entity, New Moon, was then renamed “Mylan N.V.,” replacing
Old Mylan’s stock with Mylan N.V.’s new shares in a one-to-one transac-
tion.91 Each of Old Mylan’s directors then filled Mylan N.V.’s board.92
The merger allowed Mylan to reincorporate and invert in the Nether-
lands, becoming taxable as a foreign entity.93 Although Mylan N.V. su-
perficially resembles Old Mylan regarding the company’s shareholder
84. See Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik: Why Mylan Has a Leg Up in the Vote on Its
Perrigo Bid, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2015, 3:21 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/07/
10/dealpolitik-why-mylan-has-a-leg-up-in-the-vote-on-its-perrigo-bid/ (noting that Mylan’s
board is able to use certain tools under Dutch law to win the Perrigo vote, despite the fact
that the shareholders seem to disfavor the transaction).
85. See generally Gregory R. Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A Critical
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 866 (1987) (“Tender offers for
corporate control improve the economic efficiency of the marketplace and enable share-
holders to sell their shares to an offeror at a substantial premium over the market price.
Potential acquirers, however, often face obstacles when attempting to tender their bids to
target shareholders. Target management often opposes tender offers by engaging in a wide
variety of defensive tactics to avoid the possibility of displacement in the wake of a hostile
takeover. Shareholders, as a practical matter, are powerless to stern such abuse.”).
86. Shayndi Raice & Liz Hoffman, Mylan’s Leverage to Resist Teva Deal Reveals Shift
in Rules, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2015, 7:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/article_email/mylans-
leverage-to-resist-teva-deal-reveals-shift-in-rules-1438029585-lMyQjAxMTA1OTI1ODEy
ODg0Wj.
87. About Us, MYLAN.COM, http://www.mylan.com/en/company/about-us us (last vis-
ited, Jan. 4, 2016);
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and board structures, Mylan N.V.’s internal governance was substantially
reorganized under the Netherlands’s more lenient corporate regulatory
regime. By virtue of inverting into a Dutch entity, reports suggest that
Mylan’s directors sought out the Netherlands management-friendly
Dutch regulatory regime; this is the hidden side of corporate inversions.
The first signs of conflict between Mylan’s management and ownership
surfaced soon after inverting when rival pharmaceutical company, Teva,
sought to acquire Mylan.94 Faced with a hostile acquirer, Mylan’s direc-
tors employed a notoriously “draconian” Dutch defensive measure
known as a stichting.95 A stichting is an independent third-party trust,
available only under Dutch law, that protects a target corporation from a
hostile acquirer.96 In essence, a company may issue up to 50% of its pre-
ferred stock to a stichting, preventing a hostile acquirer from gaining ma-
jority control.97 The problem was that many Mylan shareholders favored
accepting Teva’s $40 billion tender offer, yet were unable to effectuate a
deal because Mylan’s directors could use the company’s stichting to reject
almost any Teva bid.98 In fact, because it is so effective, a stichting would
likely violate U.S. law if Mylan had still been incorporated in Penn-
sylvania, transgressing both U.S. securities and corporate governance reg-
ulations.99 By authorizing Mylan’s Dutch inversion, Mylan’s shareholders
had this relinquished significant U.S. protections in favor of the Nether-
94. Id.
95. See Al Jones, Perrigo blasts Mylan in latest defense of hostile takeover bid, MICHI-
GAN LIVE (Nov. 9, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.mlive.com/business/west-michigan/index.ssf/
2015/11/perrigo_blasts_mylan_in_latest.html [https://perma.cc/X8BF-7S34].
96. See generally Shayndi Raice & Margot Patrick, The Rise of the ‘Stichting,’ WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rise-of-the-stichting-an-
obscure-takeover-defense-1429716204.
97. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Mylan’s Dutch Takeover Defense Is in Nasdaq’s Hands,
N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/business/dealbook/mylans-
dutch-takeover-defense-is-in-nasdaqs-hands.html?emc=eta1 (offering greater detail about
stichtings as an ownerless shell trusts designed to be legally distinct from the beneficial
corporation. A stichting is controlled by a board of directors who are supposed to be le-
gally distinct from the corporation. However, the corporation typically retains sole control
and discretion regarding).
98. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, A So-Called Independent Foundation Enters the
Mylan-Teva Fray, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/business/
a-so-called-independent-foundation-enters-the-mylan-teva-fray.html?_r=0 (“Hoping to
dissuade any shareholders who might prefer to go along with a Teva takeover, Mylan is
making the argument that Teva is really not an option. It is sending the message that . . .
the stichting will block it.”).
99. See Jones, supra note 95. The problem was that Mylan is listed on Nasdaq, which
proscribes companies from issuing dilutive shares to drown out hostile acquirers. Davidoff,
supra note 98. In fact, Nasdaq rules required Mylan’s board to obtain shareholder approval
before “potentially” issuing shares in excess of 20% of the company’s value, which Mylan
failed to do. Id. (“Nasdaq also has a ‘change of control rule,’ which requires that any issue
or potential issue of securities that would result in a change of control of the company must
be preapproved by shareholders.”). Professor Davidoff notes that Mylan could argue that
its shareholders have already approved of the use of the stichting, and thus a greater than
20% stock issuance, when it voted in favor of the takeover merger with Abbott Laborato-
ries, whereby the company became Dutch. This could implicitly mean that the shareholders
approved the use of all measures, including a stichting, available under Dutch law. That
said, Professor Davidoff is highly skeptical that this argument would be successful. Id.
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lands’s more management-friendly corporate governance regime. It
would soon become more apparent that Mylan’s directors structured My-
lan’s reincorporation in additional ways to increase their power relative
to shareholders.
Mylan’s directors also used the inversion process to prevent a share-
holder vote from unseating them. Most corporations keep directors ac-
countable by allowing shareholders to call a special meeting in which
shareholders may call a referendum on the board.100 Teva, as a 4.61%
shareholder of Mylan, sought to call such a vote.101 However, Mylan’s
directors drafted a special voting mechanism into the company’s Dutch
articles of incorporation: if Mylan’s shareholders successfully voted to re-
move the company’s directors, the unseated directors reserved the right
to select Mylan’s new directors.102 In other words, even if Teva unseated
the directors, Mylan’s directors would be able to select loyal executives or
even perhaps reappoint themselves.103 In light of this arrangement’s im-
permissibility under U.S. law, Mylan’s inversion appears to have helped
Mylan’s directors deprive shareholders of a critical accountability
mechanism.104
In addition, Mylan’s board allegedly violated their fiduciary duties by
rejecting Teva’s takeover offer.105 But under Dutch law, directors owe
fiduciary duties to more parties than just their corporations and share-
holders, including customers, government personnel, employees, and
stakeholders.106 In fact, Mylan’s board expressly stated that it might
subordinate shareholder preferences below stakeholders.107 When re-
100. See generally Christopher Gulinello, The Retail-Investor Vote: Mobilizing Ration-
ally Apathetic Shareholders to Preserve or Challenge the Board’s Presumption of Authority,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 547, 551-52 (2010).
101. Ronald Barusch, Deal Politik: Tax Inversion Craze Casts Confusing Shadow Over
U.S. Takeovers, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2015, 11:55 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/
2015/06/08/dealpolitik-tax-inversion-craze-casts-confusing-shadow-over-u-s-takeovers/;
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Maneuvers and Dutch Defenses that May Complicate Mylan-
Teva Takeover War, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/busi-
ness/maneuvers-and-dutch-defenses-that-may-complicate-takeover-war.html?emc=eta1
(“Under Mylan’s organizational documents, 10 percent of Mylan’s shareholders can call a
general meeting to remove the Mylan board. Teva already owns 4.61 percent and the hedge
fund Paulson & Company holds about the same, so this threshold might be easily met.”).
102. See Barusch, supra note 84.
103. Id.
104. Solomon, supra note 101; see Raice & Hoffman, supra note 86 (“At some compa-
nies, like Mylan, shareholders now have less leverage with management thanks to their
new foreign home”).
105. See Ed Silverman, Has Mylan Labs Been Stichting It to Shareholders? A Lawsuit
Says ‘Yes!’, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 28, 2015, 10:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/07/
28/has-mylan-labs-been-stichting-it-to-shareholders-a-lawsuit-says-yes/.
106. Raice & Hoffman, supra note 86 (In contrast to American corporate law where a
director owes fiduciary duties to shareholders, under Dutch Law, directors have fiduciary
duties to stakeholders. “A Mylan spokesman said, ‘Mylan certainly has always considered
the interests of shareholders. But a core principle at Mylan is that shareholders benefit
from a well-run business, and to run a business well, you need to focus on all of the stake-
holders we touch on a daily basis, including customers, patients, employees, suppliers,
creditors and communities.’”).
107. Id.
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jecting Teva’s offer, Mylan’s Executive Chairman reportedly told Teva
representatives “[t]his is a stakeholder company [now], not a shareholder
company.”108 And since fiduciary duty claims are the premier means by
which American shareholders are able to protect their ownership inter-
ests, it appears that Mylan’s shareholders lost a critical safeguard during
the company’s inversion.109
Mylan’s board may have also violated U.S. securities laws when it
sought to acquire Perrigo as a means to block Teva’s takeover. The
merger with Perrigo appealed to Mylan’s board because a surviving My-
lan/Perrigo entity would have been too large for Teva to purchase.110 But
since Mylan’s board needed shareholder approval to acquire Perrigo, the
board’s ability to ward off Teva likely depended on whether Mylan’s
shareholders voted in favor of a Perrigo acquisition.111 In hopes of win-
ning this vote, Mylan’s board issued a preliminary proxy statement invok-
ing another management-friendly Dutch voting measure established in
Mylan’s inversion: the voting cut-off date.112 A cut-off date requires
shareholders to inform a corporation’s board of their intention to vote on
a deal, either in person or by proxy, up to seven days beforehand.113 This
mechanism of allowing Mylan’s board to carry the vote likely would have
disenfranchised U.S. shareholders unfamiliar with such a requirement.114
Mylan’s stichting could have even supplied the extra votes needed by the
board.115 Not only is this type of mechanism absent from U.S. corporate
law, it also likely violates SEC proxy rules.116 Indeed, some observers
asserted that Mylan’s directors sought to suppress oppositional votes de-
spite U.S. securities laws and their shareholders’ apparent preference for
a Teva deal.
In short, this case study details the alarm that Mylan’s shareholders
failed to express when Mylan’s leadership proposed inverting. By reincor-
porating in the Netherlands, Mylan’s board took actions—with which
many shareholders sharply disagreed—that the company could not have
effectuated under American law. From modifying fiduciary duties, using
108. Raice & Hoffman, supra note 86.
109. Solomon, supra note 101; See Raice & Hoffman, supra note 86 (“At some compa-
nies, like Mylan, shareholders now have less leverage with management thanks to their
new foreign home”).
110. Don’t Cash in on Perrigo Yet, Upside Still Possible, SEEKING ALPHA (April 22,
2015, 5:27 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/3092166-dont-cash-in-on-perrigo-yet-up-
side-still-possible.
111. See Barusch, supra note 84 (stating that “The CEO of TEVA has said if [Mylan]





116. Id. (“The preliminary proxy materials say the cut-off date will be applied to at-
tempts to revoke previously given proxies, but in my view restricting the ability of share-
holders to revoke proxies at any time prior to a meeting raises significant issues under the
Securities and Exchange Commission proxy rules, which apply because Mylan is U.S. listed
and is treated for regulatory purposes as a domestic company. A person familiar with My-
lan said the proxy revocation process complies with SEC requirements.”).
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extraordinary defensive measures, and neutralizing shareholder votes,
Mylan’s directors structured the company’s inversion to entrench them-
selves on the board.117 The question, then, is why did Mylan’s sharehold-
ers agree to such a self-defeating inversion; was it irrational investing or
simply a calculated gamble gone wrong?
III. THE LAW AND INVESTORS’ (IR)RATIONAL BEHAVIORS
This Section explores the behavioral mindset of investors, shedding
light on the reasons why shareholders appear to irrationally ignore the
consequences of inverting and other regulatory-stripping transactions. In
the Mylan example, the most logical explanation is that Mylan’s share-
holders failed to appreciate the ways in which Mylan’s board could struc-
ture an inversion to undermine shareholder rights. But considering the
sophistication and resourcefulness of institutional investors, it seems im-
plausible that investors could have acted so recklessly.118
Helping to explain the lack of rationality underlying the inversion puz-
zle is a few decades’ worth of legal scholarship that analyzes the thought
processes of investors and shareholders. Investors were historically con-
sidered “rational,”119 meaning that they weighed all known aspects of a
company before investing.120 And since institutional investors dedicate
such significant resources to the evaluation processes, it was believed that
stock prices quickly incorporate all known information about publicly
traded companies.121 While some individuals do make investment errors,
the odds of overvaluing or undervaluing a company are about equal; thus,
investment mistakes “wash out” of stock prices, rendering markets that
117. See Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Mylan, Valeant and Theranos: What the Heck, Biotech?,
FORTUNE (Nov. 13, 2015, 10:42 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/11/13/theranos-valeant-my-
lan-governance-failures/ (mentioning that Mylan’s antitakeover device effectively trans-
ferred company control from shareholders to an “entrenched” board).
118. See Brian G. Cartwright, Whither the SEC Now? 95 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2009)
(“[O]ne thing is clear: sophisticated institutional investors are different from retail inves-
tors. Sophisticated institutional investors have highly professional staffs and substantial re-
sources. They can hire outside firms and advisers. They have access to extensive
information technology resources, and many have offices worldwide.”).
119. See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulations? Some Behavioral Observa-
tions Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1413 (2002) (“Conventional
Law and economics assumes that individuals are rational, self-interested utility
maximizers.”).
120. See Scott Russell, Regulation Fair Disclosure: The Death of the Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis and the Birth of Herd Behavior, 82 B.U. L. REV. 527, 549-50 (2002)
(“An ‘efficient’ market is defined as a market where there are large numbers of rational,
profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of
individual securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to
all participants. . . ‘Rational’ and ‘intelligent’ market participants are an essential ingredi-
ent in Fama’s hypothesis. ‘Rational’ is defined as ‘[h]aving or exercising the ability to rea-
son.’ ‘Intelligent’ is defined as ‘[s]howing sound judgment and rationality.’”).
121. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1984) (noting that “numerous studies demonstrate that the
capital market responds efficiently to an extraordinary variety of information”).
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accurately value securities.122 This theory, the efficient market hypothesis
(EMH), gained such wide acceptance that it has become the foundation
for most class action securities lawsuits.123 For instance, the United States
Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson124 ruled that plaintiffs could support
a securities fraud claim without ever having come into contact with a
fraudulent statement.125 The Court’s logic was that since rational invest-
ing produces accurately priced markets, which fraud distorts, investors
can suffer injuries from fraudulent statements by simply relying upon
publicly available market prices.126 This theory became known as the
“fraud on the market theory.”127 Applying the EMH to inversions, the
decision whether to invest in an inverted company should be the product
of all available, thoughtfully considered information.
But since the bankruptcies of Enron and Worldcom in 2001 and 2002,
respectively, —as well as other financial disasters128 —the EMH has
come under attack and fallen out of favor.129 How could a market that so
accurately prices stocks make such gross errors? The indicia of account-
ing fraud and poor fundamentals were apparent, yet experts consistently
misjudged these companies.130 Moreover, Enron and Worldcom were
hardly isolated incidents, but instead segments of a larger, poorly valued
market.131 And considering the EMH’s apparent inability to reflect real-
ity, several Supreme Court Justices seem eager to eliminate notions of
122. Id. at 581 (“Although individual traders will attach biased weights because each
knows only a fraction of the relevant information, the cumulative weights will be unbiased
unless trading volume is itself skewed toward the views of one set of uninformed traders.
In this respect, unsystematic bias ‘washes out’ over trading in the same way that unsys-
tematic risk ‘washes out’ in a diversified portfolio.”).
123. See, e.g., id. at 549 (“Of all recent developments in financial economics, the effi-
cient capital market hypothesis has achieved the widest acceptance by the legal culture”);
Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 895, 896-98 (2013) (noting the central role of efficient markets within the “fraud on
the market theory” in securities class actions, as codified by Basic); Russell, supra note 120,
at 550 (explaining the function of an efficient market as when “competition among the
many intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices
of individual securities already reflect the effects of information based both on events that
have already occurred and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in
the future. In other words, in an efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a
security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value.”).
124. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
125. See id. at 241-42.
126. Id. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-1161 (3d. Cir. 1986)).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME (Mar. 17,
2008), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.
129. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 136 (2002) (describ-
ing how the Enron bankruptcy caused legal scholars to reconsider the efficient market
hypothesis).
130. Id. at 135-36 (“To a skeptic about the stock markets, the Enron debacle comes as
no surprise. . . The market fell in love with the company and, like many lovers, was far too
slow to realize that the object of devotion was cheating.”).
131. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble,
100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012) (seeking to explain an even greater financial crisis based upon
poor investing: the housing crisis leading to the “great recession”).
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investor rationality from securities litigation.132 In Halliburton Co. v. Eric
P. John Fund, Inc.,133 the concurrence remarked that “‘overwhelming
empirical evidence’ now suggests that even when markets do incorporate
public information, they often fail to do so accurately.”134
Behavioral economics, which combines aspects of psychology and
traditional economics, is especially critical of the EMH.135 The behavioral
economics literature asserts that people are irrational; they are not ran-
domly irrational, but instead respond to stimuli pathologically, causing
systematic over or under estimation of risk.136 For instance, studies show
that investors value the market more optimistically when the weather is
pleasant.137 Other examples include overestimating one’s own abilities,
status quo bias, reliance on heuristics, and confirmation bias.138 The most
influential behavioral economics concept is loss aversion, which suggests
that investors become overly risky in the face of losses, while too con-
servative otherwise.139
Perhaps behavioral economics can shed light on the inversion trend.
Consider prior studies finding that people become more likely to adopt
copycat behaviors —despite whether such behaviors are counterproduc-
tive or not—when others appear to profit from bending or breaking the
rules.140 The key is that before making investment decisions, individuals
tend to encounter voluminous amounts of information which must be re-
132. See Halliburton Co. v. Eric P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2421 (2013)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“As it turns out, even ‘well-developed’ markets (like the New
York Stock Exchange) do not uniformly incorporate information into the market prices
with high speed.”). See generally Charles R. Korsmo, Market Efficiency and Fraud on the
Market: The Danger of Halliburton, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827, 830 (2014) (noting
that Justice Alito’s concurrence in Amgen suggests that Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas
would like to overturn Basic based upon the faulty foundation of the efficient market
hypothesis).
133. 134 S.Ct. at 2421.
134. Id. at 2421 (alterations in original).
135. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regula-
tions: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992) (offering a good primer
discussing the relationship between rationality based investor theories and behavioral
economics).
136. See Tom C. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 468-72 (2015) (re-
viewing evidence that investors do not actually act rationally but are instead susceptible to
certain psychologically deficient investing processes); see also Choi & Pritchard, supra note
34; Prentice, supra note 119.
137. Adi Osovsky, The Curious Case of the Secondary Market with Respect to Investor
Protection, 82 TENN. L. REV. 83, 128 (2014) (“It has become evident that even mood and
emotions are dominant in the decision making processes of investors. Indeed, even the
weather affects investment decisions.”).
138. Tom C. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
325, 341-48 (2011).
139. Id. At 342-43 (“Individuals are loss averse. They do not assign static values to
objects; and when they give up or lose something. . . The negative impact of a loss is greater
than the positive impact of an equal gain.”); see generally Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 38,
at 1019-21.
140. See Fred C. Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes: Are Lawyers Rational Ac-
tors?, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 688 (2010) (mentioning the concept of the “cheater
herd” and referring to groups of supposedly rational actors who become more likely to
bend the rules when others appear to be cheating).
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duced to understandable and digestible portions.141 One technique is to
follow the crowd; research shows that, under certain circumstances even
sophisticated institutional investors ignore objective analyses in favor of
peer mimicking.142 The urge to replicate others may become especially
overwhelming when the masses appear to be cheating.143 One article ex-
plained the concept of “herd cheating,” analogizing baseball’s steroids
scandal with unethical lawyering.144 Both phenomena involve those
driven to cheat by a perception that others are profiting from breaking
the rules.145 The interesting conclusion is that individuals sometimes
cheat even if the strategy produces a worse result than following the
rules, and thus, could be considered irrational.146
In fact, there was an illustrative story from the Petrified National For-
est in northeastern Arizona. For some time, park visitors have been tak-
ing home pieces of petrified wood, depleting the park of its namesake.147
In hopes of reducing theft, park officials posted signs informing visitors
about the harms caused by thievery.148 The strategy not only failed to
prevent theft but resulted in tripled theft rates wherever the signs were
posted.149 As it turns out, when people appear to gain a benefit from
cheating, including petrified wood thievery, observers become more
likely to deviate from fair play and replicate the rule breakers.150
Perhaps with inversions, investors and shareholders are irrationally
willing to invert because of the popularity and perceived illicitness of the
transaction. The amount of information available about publicly traded
companies is so great that investors seldom seem to consider the regula-
141. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2000) (arguing that a key determinant of herd behavior is incomplete
information. “Herding can. . . be seen as a response to bounded rationality and information
asymmetries. Under conditions of complexity and uncertainty, actors who perceive them-
selves as having limited information but can observe the actions of presumptively better-
informed persons may attempt to free-ride by following the latter’s decisions.”).
142. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
215, 349 (2002) (describing the propensity of institutional investors to engage in herd be-
haviors); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics about Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
627, 643-49 (1996).
143. Zacharias, supra note 140, at 688 (remarking that people tend to pathologically
follow “the cheater herd in situations in which financial self-interest is particularly strong,
when the cheaters so dominate their field that rule violations are necessary in order to




146. See Deven R. Desai, Bounded by Brands: An Information Network Approach to
Trademarks, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 837-38 (2014) (describing the irrationality of herd
behavior in the trademarks context).
147. Stephen J. Dubner, Riding the Herd Mentality: A New Freakonomics Podcast,
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tory consequences of inverting. If a critical mass of individuals invest in
“cheating” companies, this could inspire others to follow suit, thus ignor-
ing possible dangers. In other words, investors may be irrationally drawn
to companies that play fast and loose with the rules, for example, by in-
vesting in Caribbean tax havens.
Therefore, it is possible that investors and shareholders make calcu-
lated gambles that an inversion’s lower corporate tax rate outweighs its
attendant regulatory dangers. That said, behavioral economics may better
explain the reasons why corporate inversions fail to deter investors—peo-
ple appear almost hardwired to make poor investment decisions. Before
Section V empirically tests whether investors appreciate the legal and
regulatory ramifications of inverting, Section IV details the additional le-
gal and regulatory frameworks implicated by inversions. A major point is
that directors can quietly manipulate an inversion’s structure to either
protect or harm shareholder interests via a number of regulatory adding
or stripping transactions.
IV. THE INVERSION PROCESS’S OTHER REGULATORY
CONSEQUENCES
This Section briefly explores how companies may structure inversions
to generate additional regulatory benefits or harms, depending on one’s
perspective. As mentioned, inversions are motivated by the regulatory
advantages that foreign reincorporation provides, chief among them is a
foreign tax rate.151 But in doing so, migrating companies can also modify
the manner in which they must comply with other regulatory
frameworks.152 Not only can this process lower compliance costs,153 it
may also alter the relationship between a company’s directors and share-
holders—possibly to the shareholder’s detriment.154 The following illus-
trates the regulatory considerations, tradeoffs, and obstacles that
companies encounter when structuring an inversion and its hidden effects
on the director-shareholder relationship. The primary regulatory
frameworks, besides taxes, inverted companies may modify include cor-
porate governance, securities, and antitrust compliance.
A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The jurisdiction in which a company inverts—and thus reincorpo-
rates—has just as salient implications for its corporate governance struc-
151. See Fleischer, supra note 39, at 229.
152. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securities
Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (2008) (finding that countries can attract companies
using their securities law; “stock exchanges are increasingly poised to operate as sellers of
both domestic and foreign law”).
153. See generally Fleischer, supra note 39, at 238 (“The government imposes regula-
tory costs on transactions in the form of taxes, securities-law disclosure requirements, anti-
trust constraints, environmental-compliance obligations, and so on.”).
154. See supra Section II (discussing how Mylan orchestrated its inversion, likely to the
shareholders’ disadvantage).
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ture as its tax rate. By virtue of inverting and reincorporating, a company
becomes subject to its new jurisdiction’s corporate governance statute,
which limits the ways it may exercise various corporate powers and struc-
tures internal affairs. For instance, U.S. corporations must perform cer-
tain non-optional activities, such as calling annual meetings, electing
directors to the board, and holding shareholders votes.155 Importantly,
under the “internal affairs doctrine,” a U.S. company has almost com-
plete freedom to incorporate in whichever jurisdiction it prefers, giving
U.S. companies a large selection of corporate governance regimes from
which to choose.156 The best-known corporate body of law belongs to
Delaware, which non-coincidentally is home to more Fortune 500 compa-
nies than all other jurisdictions combined.157 While a greater review of
corporate law’s efficacy can be found elsewhere,158 Delaware’s domi-
nance is thought to be attributable to the state’s keenly developed corpo-
rate body of law and court system.159
The issue is that companies considering an inversion face important
decisions regarding potential corporate governance structures. Because
companies must reincorporate wherever they invert, an inverted com-
pany becomes subject to its tax haven’s corporate governance laws.160
Commentators suggest that this creates a tradeoff between selecting an
optimal corporate governance structure or tax rate.161 For example, a
company incorporated in a reputable corporate governance jurisdiction,
such as Delaware, must necessarily abandon those benefits after
inverting.162
Importantly, a company’s site of incorporation has substantial implica-
tions for its director/shareholder relationship. Perhaps Delaware law’s
most salient benefit concerns how the state balances the competing inter-
ests between shareholders and directors.163 This problem becomes espe-
cially acute when a hostile takeover bid pits shareholders against
155. See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 211.
156. David M. Wilson, Climate Change: The Real Threat to Delaware Corporate Law,
Why Delaware Must Keep a Watchful Eye on the Content of Political Change in the Air, 5
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 481, 482 (2010).
157. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency,
15 DEL J. CORP. L. 885, 886-87 (1990).
158. See, e.g., John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1915, 1925-26 (2012) (discussing the dominance of Delaware in the market
for corporate charters).
159. In fact, defensive measures can bolster a firm’s value because a hostile acquirer
must raise its offer to surpass the Unocal standard. See Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986); see also Alva, supra note 157, at 893-
94 (citing Roberta Romano, The State of Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 709 (1987); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incor-
poration Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 241 (1985)).
160. Kun, supra note 23, at 313.
161. Kane & Rock, supra note 5, at 1230.
162. Id. at 1236-37.
163. See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181,
200-203 (2013).
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directors.164 Although Delaware directors have “unflinching” duties to
act in their shareholders’ best interests, shareholders often favor hostile
takeovers and the premium payments that acquirers offer, while directors
fear losing lucrative board positions.165 The balance struck by Delaware
provides corporate directors with the leeway to resist hostile takeovers
using defensive measures, so long as the measures ostensibly increase
firm value.166 Indeed, defensive measures benefit shareholders to the de-
gree that they force a hostile acquirer to increase its tender offer, bolster-
ing the target firm’s value. To balance whether a defensive measure aids
shareholders or entrenches directors, pursuant to Delaware’s Unocal
standard,167 directors may only use defensive measures that are propor-
tional to the threat posed by a hostile acquirer.168 Combined with Dela-
ware’s lenient business judgment rule, directors seldom face liability.169
But when a takeover overture becomes significant, or almost imminent, a
director’s duties change; directors must then attempt to sell the company
for as close to its greatest possible value.170 Delaware has thus balanced
director and shareholder interests, whereby shareholders can expect max-
imum value, yet directors may act with minimal fear of liability.
In contrast, other jurisdictions operate more pro-management or pro-
shareholder corporate governance statutes. For instance, some European
nations disfavor hostile takeovers, making those jurisdictions particularly
attractive to some directors.171 And while the fiduciary duties owed to
shareholders are a hallmark of American corporate law, directors in
many European countries owe fiduciary duties to non-equity actors in-
cluding employees and stakeholders.172 Therefore, expanding the scope
164. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277-78 (2d. Cir.
1987) (“A director’s obligation to protect the financial interests of the corporation, and
thereby the shareholders, may not be compromised by a competing interest in other legiti-
mate corporate purposes, such as fending off a hostile takeover bid. When engaging in
defensive maneuvers. . . a director’s primary obligation is to ensure the overall fairness,
including a fair option price, to the shareholders.”).
165. See, e.g., id.
166. Paul L. Regan, What’s Left of Unocl?, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 966 (2001) (discuss-
ing the use of defensive measures typically utilized against hostile takeovers available
under Delaware corporate law, and explaining that shareholders can misjudge the “intrin-
sic” value of a firm upon being offered a stock premium by a hostile acquirer).
167. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“A further
aspect is the element of balance. If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the
business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This entails
an analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate
enterprise.”).
168. Id.
169. See In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, 67 A.3d 496, 526 (2013) (stating that, “the
business judgment rule standard of review applies and precludes judicial second-guessing
so long as the board’s decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose”) (altera-
tion in original).
170. Revlon, 506 A.2d. 173, 185 (ruling that a company must effectuate a merger that
maximizes shareholder value when it becomes apparent that a tender offer meets a level
exceeding the Unocal standard).
171. See Jens Dammann, The Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining American Exception-
alism in Corporate Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 450-51 (2014).
172. See Silverman, supra note 105.
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of actors to whom fiduciary duties are owed provides directors with sig-
nificant capacity to justify value-stripping actions. After all, an act that
harms shareholders can be substantiated if it benefits a stakeholder like
the local government. In the Mylan case study, Mylan’s directors rebuffed
allegations that rejecting Teva’s tender offer harmed shareholders, noting
that, as a Dutch entity, they owed duties to stakeholders, not just
shareholders.173
In turn, inverting can change more regulatory frameworks than simply
a company’s tax rate. While corporate governance is perhaps the best-
known inversion consequence, other lesser-discussed regulatory
frameworks include securities and antitrust laws.
B. SECURITIES LAW
Inverting, or otherwise reincorporating abroad, can diminish a com-
pany’s responsibility to comply with important aspects of U.S. securities
laws. The United States has established two functionally different securi-
ties frameworks of varying levels of scrutiny and cost.174 American corpo-
rations are per se subject to the United States’ more onerous securities
rubric,175 which makes a firm’s country of incorporation especially impor-
tant for whether, and to what extent, it must comply with securities regu-
lations,176 including auditing, disclosure, and corporate governance
requirements.177 But, in order to attract international IPOs and other for-
eign listings, the United States offers foreign corporations listed on U.S.
exchanges a more relaxed securities treatment as a “foreign private is-
suer” (FPI).178
173. See infra Section II (in the Mylan example, directors of a Dutch corporation have
fiduciary duties to the company’s stakeholders, which is distinct from shareholders).
174. See Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoid-
ing?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 142-43 (2003).
175. Pursuant to Rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 3b-4(c) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, the definition of a foreign private issuer entails “any foreign
issuer other than a foreign government except an issuer meeting the following condi-
tion . . . : (i). More than 50 percent of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer are
directly or indirectly owned of record by residents of the United States; and (ii). Any of the
following: (A) The majority of the executive officers or directors are United States citizens
or residents; (B) More than 50 percent of the assets of the issuer are located in the United
States; or (C) The business of the issuer is administered principally in the United States.”
17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2016); see also Barbara Black, Introduction: The Globalization of Se-
curities Regulation- -Competition or Coordination?, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 461-62 (2010);
see also Christopher Hung Nie Woo, United States Securities Regulation and Foreign Pri-
vate Issuers: Lessons From the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 119, 151-53 (2011);
Soo-Jeong Shin, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on Foreign Issuers Listed on
the U.S. Capital Markets, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 701, 701-02 (2007).
176. Natalya Shnitser, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC and Pri-
vate Enforcement Against Foreign Private Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 1638, 1652 (2010) (“The
United States effectively has two securities regulation regimes: one for domestic issuers
and another for foreign issuers. The latter ‘cuts corners’ on key issues of corporate
governance.”).
177. Id. at 1652-53.
178. See generally Steven M. Davidoff Solomon, Regulating Listings in a Global Market,
86 N.C. L. REV. 89, 130 (2007); see also Brummer, supra note152, at 1438 (“[S]tock ex-
changes are increasingly poised to operate as sellers of both domestic and foreign law.”);
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If a U.S. company endeavors to become an FPI, it must reincorporate
abroad, perhaps using the inversion process to execute the transaction.179
However, the migrating company would still be considered a U.S. corpo-
ration for the sake of securities laws, unless non-U.S. residents hold over
50% of its outstanding voting shares.180 If that condition is met, then (1) a
majority of the company’s executive officers or directors must be foreign
citizens, (2) more than 50% of the firm’s assets must be located abroad,
and (3) the majority of the corporation’s business must be conducted
abroad.181 While these are typically difficult thresholds for small U.S.-
based companies to meet, multinational entities generally have a greater
capacity to structure their corporate affairs to become an FPI.
After achieving FPI status, a newly minted foreign corporation may
avoid filing quarterly reports182 and other burdensome disclosure state-
ments.183 Since U.S. securities laws also relax corporate governance stan-
dards,184 commentators have warned that FPIs are likely to generate
significant conflicts of interest.185 The SEC reduced disclosure obligations
of FPIs even further in 2008; FPIs co-issuing securities on foreign ex-
changes are now only required to disclose primary firm documents trans-
lated into English.186 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also permits FPIs to use
their home country’s accounting methods, as opposed to the typically
more rigorous U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP).187 The result is an attractive securities framework for foreign
Woo, supra note 76, at 152 (“[S]tudies suggest that the costs imposed by SOX are not that
significant for foreign private issuers accessing the U.S. market.”).
179. 26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(1) (2012) (defining “expatriated,” and referring to these com-
panies as such).
180. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (2016).
181. Cf. id.
182. See, e.g., Shnitser, supra note 176, at 1653 (“Foreign issuers are also exempt from
several duties with regard to proxy statements under section 14 of the Exchange Act and
short sales and short-swing profits by corporate insiders under section 16.”); Licht, supra
note 174, at 152 (“Form 20-F requires foreign issuers to disclose the names of persons
known to own more than 10 percent of the issuer’s voting securities. Foreign issuers are
only required to disclose the total amount of voting securities owned by the officers and
directors as a group, without naming them. In contrast, the threshold for US issuers is 5
percent, and issuers must disclose individual holdings of their officers and directors.”).
183. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The SEC and Foreign Companies-A Balance of Competing
Interests, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 471 (2010).
184. Shnitser, supra note 176, at 1653.
185. See Licht, supra note 174, at 152 (“The biggest gap, perhaps, concerns the thorniest
issue: disclosure of conflicts of interest. Form 20-F permits foreign private issuers to dis-
close aggregate remuneration and aggregate options to purchase securities, unless the is-
suer already discloses data for individually named directors and officers. Foreign issuers
are further exempted from disclosing data concerning material transactions with officers,
directors, and control persons, unless the issuer already makes such disclosures. According
to Loss and Seligman’s authoritative treatise, “[t]hese requirements significantly compro-
mise the more demanding conflict of interest requirements found in Items 402 to 404 of
Regulations S-K.”) (citing LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 2 SECURITIES REGULATIONS
769 (3d ed. 1989)).
186. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (effective Oct. 10, 2008); Shnitser, supra note 176, at
1652.
187. Black, supra note 176, at 461-62; Yuliya Guseva, Cross-Listings and the New World
of International Capital: Another Look at the Efficiency and Extraterritoriality of Securities
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entities.
Importantly, becoming an FPI through the inversion process is more
likely to benefit a corporation’s management at the expense of sharehold-
ers. Consider that securities regulations are thought to safeguard individ-
ual investors as opposed to companies and management.188 For instance,
securities laws establish elevated corporate governance standards and
therefore create a level of director accountability.189 Likewise, disclosure
duties disseminate company information that investors would not other-
wise be able to obtain.190 Thus, shareholders and directors are likely to
disagree about the optimal strength of securities laws because more re-
laxed regulations generally favor management who tend to benefit from
less burdensome compliance duties and limited exposure to litigation.
C. MERGERS AND ANTITRUST
The inversion process can also create important regulatory advantages
on the international merger market, as evidenced by the number of in-
verted firms that recently have acquired other international corpora-
tions.191 While most reports have focused on how inverted firms use their
lower tax rates to create synergies with foreign merger targets,192 seldom
is it discussed that inverting can diminish antitrust regulations, making
mergers easier—or at least less costly—to accomplish.193 From an Ameri-
can corporation’s perspective, the regulatory process governing prospec-
tive mergers and acquisitions is overly burdensome.194 The Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act (HSR Act) requires mergers involving a U.S. corporation
and at least one dominant market actor to receive antitrust
Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 411, 452-53 (2013) (“[N]umerous concessions were made to FPI
with respect to compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The SEC, inter alia, grant
exemptions from Rule 10A-3 to foreign issuers permitting representatives of governments
or specific employees to serve on audit committees and recognizes certain alternative au-
diting arrangements. Overall, the SEC regulations take into account local variations and
functional substitutes existing in foreign jurisdictions with respect to auditing committees,
independence of auditors, variations in corporate governance structures . . . .”).
188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(d) (2016) (“Notwithstanding paragraph (c) of this section, in
the case of a new registrant with the Commission, the determination of whether an issuer is
a foreign private issuer will be made as of a date within 30 days prior to the issuer’s filing of
an initial registration statement under either the Act or the Securities Act of 1933.”).
189. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1393 (1999).
190. Id. at 1338 (explaining that “there is a socially optimal level of disclosure. More
information about the issuer and the resulting increase in its share price accuracy produces
social benefits in the form of improved selection of new investment projects, improved
managerial performance, and reduced investor risk.”).
191. See David Crow et al., Tax inversion curb turns tables on US, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 15,
2015, 10:36 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e1ba6eb0-ca5c-11e4-b8ff-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3jf0OegrJ.
192. See id.
193. See Andrew G. Howell, Why Premerger Review Needed Reform—And Still Does,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1703, 1726-27 (2002) (discussing the costs of antitrust
preclearance borne to both society and to individual companies).
194. See, e.g., Stephen Paul Paschall, Antitrust and Hospital Mergers:A  Law and Eco-
nomics Rationale for Exemption, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 61, 65-66 (1991) (describing the antitrust
costs in hospital mergers).
480 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
preclearance.195 When the proposed merger is between a U.S. corpora-
tion possessing more than $50 million in assets, the preclearance process
becomes especially long and costly.196 During that time, the Federal
Trade Commission must review whether the proposed acquisition is likely
to harm competition; if it does, the merger is blocked.197 In light of the
cost and uncertainty in the HSR Act, some proposed business combina-
tions are abandoned before serious discussions may begin.198
However, foreign corporations enjoy antitrust exceptions, which makes
acquisitions easier and cheaper. If a foreign corporation proposes acquir-
ing a foreign entity, it entirely avoids the preclearance requirements un-
less either (1) the target company owns more than $50 million worth of
assets in the United States or (2) the aggregate sales, or controlled assets,
of both companies is more than $110 million.199 In turn, the process of
inverting can eliminate costly merger regulations when the foreign target
company has a limited U.S. presence.
D. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS AND INVESTORS
Although tax benefits are assuredly inverting’s primary regulatory ad-
vantage, anecdotal evidence suggests that securities, antitrust, and corpo-
rate governance considerations also provide incentives to invert. But this
raises a significant question. As discussed, because corporate regulations
provide shareholders, who have minimal managerial rights, with the
means to seek information and protect ownership interests, the inversion
process potentially harms shareholders. So why do shareholders author-
ize corporate inversions? Likewise, why would investors purchase a com-
pany’s stock that used the inversion process to dismantle shareholder
195. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
90 Stat. 1383 (1976). See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 312-13 (1962) (ex-
plaining that the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 18, “prohibit[s] the acquisition by one corpora-
tion of the stock of another corporation when such acquisition would result in a substantial
lessening of competition between the acquiring and the acquired companies, or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce”).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012).
197. Matthew S. Bailey, The Hart-Scott- Rodino Act: Needing A Second Opinion About
Second Requests, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 455 (2006) (“On average, compliance with Second
Requests costs merger parties $5 million; however, it is not uncommon for complex trans-
actions to result in compliance costs upwards of $20 million. For example, the Exxon-Mobil
merger reportedly cost one of the parties more than $30 million to comply with the
agency’s Second Request.”); see also Daniel E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary
Antitrust Legislation, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, Part III (2006) (explaining the guidelines
uses to assess proposed mergers).
198. Paschall, supra note 194, at 65  (“The prospect of antitrust litigation increases the
costs and reduces the likelihood of mergers.”).
199. 16 C.F.R. § 802.51(b)(1) (2016) (In greater detail, the statutory exemption to the
HSR Act’s preclearance is met if the foreign acquirer: “holds assets located in the United
States . . . having an aggregate total value of over $50 million (as adjusted); or made aggre-
gate sales in or into the United States of over $50 million (as adjusted) in its most recent
fiscal year,”); 16 C.F.R. § 802.51(c)(2)-(3) (“The aggregate sales of the acquiring and ac-
quired persons in or into the United States are less than $110 million (as adjusted) in their
respective most recent fiscal years; [and] [t]he aggregate total assets of the acquiring and
acquired persons located in the United States . . . are less than $110 million”).
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protections? Are individuals acting irrationally when they support these
companies or could there be a more logical reason? The following Section
empirically tests these questions.
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The following analysis examines the inversion puzzle by empirically in-
vestigating how individuals perceive and invest in companies based upon
the regulatory regimes they have adopted and/or avoided. The following
hypotheses are tested using two different statistical treatments. The first
hypothesis from behavioral economics suggests that investors are
hardwired to act irrationally.200 In the inversion context, shareholders
and investors should logically prefer companies operating under strong
legal frameworks, yet anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals ignore
corporate law’s value and the manner in which it protects shareholder
and investor interests.201 In Mylan, the company’s shareholders over-
whelmingly approved Mylan’s inversion, which provided Mylan’s direc-
tors with the means to strip shareholders of critical shareholder
protections found under U.S. law.202 Considering the foreseeability of
this result, and the ensuing destruction of shareholder value, the behav-
ioral economics hypothesis follows that individuals and shareholders irra-
tionally ignore the value of corporate laws when confronted with
proposed inversions.
The competing hypothesis asserts that shareholders invest thoughtfully
and wisely.203 Because inversions are quite complex, it is easy to assume
that firms invert for the sake of dismantling shareholder protections—
some may. But many corporations invert in jurisdictions with strong cor-
porate governance, such as Ireland, while others, despite the possibility of
becoming an FPI, choose to comply with the more stringent set of U.S.
securities regulations.204 Considering this narrative, investors may actu-
ally comprehend the sophisticated landscape of international transac-
tional law and invest accordingly.
Empirically, these hypotheses are testable. Since firm value is largely
determined by the rate in which individuals invest; companies operating
under strong regulatory regimes should be valued more than companies
that dodge meaningful regulations.205 But if investors are indifferent to
the law, firm value should turn out to be statistically unrelated to vari-
200. See supra Section III (explaining behavioral economics’ application to investing).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. (explaining the efficient markets hypothesis).
204. See Soyoung Kim & Olivia Oran, INSIGHT-Irish, Dutch, UK law firms in tax in-
version beauty contest in U.S., REUTERS (July 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/
deals-taxinversions-lawfirms-idUSL2N0PK1L820140724.
205. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware law improve firm value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525,
529 (2001) (explaining the logic that “[i]f investors regularly pay more for assets governed
by Delaware law, Delaware firms will be worth more. Similarly, if investors discount the
price paid for assets governed by Delaware law, Delaware firms should be worth less.”).
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ables representing various regulatory controls.206
A. RESEARCH DESIGN
The following analysis empirically examines the value of the regulatory
choices made by publicly traded companies listed on U.S. stock ex-
changes, using both an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and
probit analysis. The study’s unit of analysis is company-year, spanning
from 1995 to 2015. Thus, a company has an entry for each year it was
publicly traded. This range was chosen because the modern corporate in-
version trend began, for the most part, in the mid-1990s.207 The dataset,
including all companies and most variables, was generated using
Compustat.208
In the first model—the OLS regression—the dependent variable is
Firm Value.209 Older works approximated firm value using a company’s
stock price, but this method has fallen out of favor.210 The modern ap-
proach, as used in this Article, calculates a company’s Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s
Q is defined as the ratio between a company’s market value of assets to
its book value of assets.211 The formula used to calculate Tobin’s Q was
provided by an article authored by Ahn and Shrestha.212 Again, this Arti-
cle follows other studies and uses the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q.213
The independent variables (i.e., the variable) that the research was pri-
marily interested in investigating included whether a company had under-
gone an Inversion and thus, reincorporated abroad with the intent of
becoming taxable as a foreign entity. The companies identified as having
inverted are those found on the list provided by the Congressional Re-
206. See id.
207. Hwang, supra note 36, at 824-26 (The second generation of inversions—the first
generation after the first anti-inversion laws were passed—started around the Helen of
Troy inversion in 1994.).
208. Compustat is the commonly used, industry standard database—compiled by Dow
Jones & Company and offered by the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of
Business—offering a tremendous sum of information regarding accounting information of
publicly trade corporations. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case
for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1063 n.58 (1992).
209. See Table 1 infra Appendix.
210. See Daines, supra note 205, at 528.
211. Daines, supra note 205, at 530 (“Tobin’s Q estimates the firm’s market value di-
vided by its replacement cost. This ratio represents a firm’s investment or growth opportu-
nities, including those added by management and corporate law rules.”).
212. Seoungpil Ahn & Keshab Shrestha, The Differential Effects of Classified Boards
on Firm Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3993, 4011 (2013) (explaining, using Compustat, that
Tobin’s Q can be found by calculating “the ratio of the market value of assets to Compus-
tat item 6, assets. The market value of assets is obtained as item 6, assets, - item 60, com-
mon equity, + market value of equity (item 199, price-close, x item 54, shares
outstanding.”).
213. See, e.g., George Allayannis et al., The use of foreign currency derivatives, corpo-
rate governance, and firm value around the world, 87 J. INT’L ECON. 65, 68 (2012) (using the
natural log of Tobin’s Q.).
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search Service.214 Inversion was coded using a “dummy” variable, mean-
ing that a coding of a “1” represents that the company inverted, while “0”
means that it did not invert. For example, if a company inverted in the
year 2000, Inversion was coded as a 1 for each company-year beginning
with, and following, the year 2000. All prior years received a “0.” This
variable was expected to be statistically significant—meaning that inver-
sions were not randomly associated with firm value, but instead actually
influenced firm value. If inverting promoted firm value, then the Inver-
sion coefficient should have been positive and significant, but if inver-
sions harmed firm value, then the Inversion coefficient would be negative
and significant.215
Next, inverted companies are thought to incorporate in jurisdictions
with poor corporate governance regimes.216 Since prior research has
shown that ineffective corporate governance laws detract from firm
value,217 the second independent variable represents the Corporate Gov-
ernance rating in the country of incorporation. The variable was drawn
from Governance Metrics International (GMI), which provides national
corporate governance scores.218 GMI determined each country’s score
based upon their tolerance of, for example, non-independent boards of
directors. The scores ranged from a high of 7.60 to a low of 2.13. Most
likely, as indicated by prior works, corporate governance will have a posi-
tive relationship with firm value, with stronger corporate governance
structures enhancing firm value.219
The third independent variable indicates whether a company complied
with the onerous U.S. securities regime or the less burdensome frame-
work as an FPI. Recall that U.S. corporations inherently receive the more
taxing security treatment.220 However, foreign companies may potentially
become an FPI using the inversion process as a means to avoid burden-
some auditing, corporate governance, and disclosure requirements.221
214. A Spike in Corporate Inversions, DEMOCRATS WAYS AND MEANS, http://demo-
crats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/
A_Spike_in_Corporate_Inversions.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
215. See Daines, supra note 206 at 525-26; see, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Pfizer’s creative
merger plan revives concerns about tax-avoiding ‘inversions,’ L. A. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-pfizer-s-creative-merger-20151116-col-
umn.html (discussing the negative backlash following the Pfizer inversion).
216. Kim & Oran, supra note 204 (noting that directors prefer to invest in the Nether-
lands due to the country’s pro-management corporate governance rules).
217. See, e.g., Daines, supra note 205, at 547-49 (finding that Delaware’s strong govern-
ance laws improves firm value).
218. MSCI, https://www.msci.com/esg-integration.
219. Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 QUAR-
TERLY J. ECON. 107, 125-28 (2003) (finding stronger corporate governance laws promoting
shareholder rights promotes firm value).
220. See supra Section IV.B (discussing how place of incorporation affects a firm’s rela-
tionship with U.S. securities laws).
221. Larry A. Cerutti & Jason Lee, Corporate Inversions: Considerations Other Than
Tax Benefits, BNA’S CORPORATE COUNSEL WEEKLY (Sep. 24, 2014) (noting that inverted
firms can potentially qualify as a foreign private issuer).
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This variable, referred to as FPI, is captured by a dummy score: 1 equal-
ing foreign private issuer, while 0 entails any other arrangement.
But perhaps there is a difference between being an actual foreign FPI
or an American-headquartered FPI. Indeed, it should be of little surprise
that a foreign headquartered/incorporated firm listed on a U.S. exchange
would take advantage of the many FPI exceptions because after all, cur-
rent law incentivizes this outcome.222 Investors might also be more skepti-
cal of a U.S.-headquartered firm, which has reorganized its corporate
structure to become an FPI. This type of strategy may be viewed as a
surreptitiously naked regulatory stripping action. Considering this possi-
bility, the variable USA FPI was added. It is represented by a “1” if a firm
is domestically headquartered yet organized abroad as an FPI. All other
observations receive a “0.” USA FPI will potentially demonstrate that
such firms are received more harshly than truly foreign FPIs.
Another important variable is a company’s Corporate Tax Rate.223
Most evidence suggests that tax rates are important, especially in light of
the resources spent by companies to invert.224 While there is an Inversion
variable, Inversion only captures a small collection of tax-motivated com-
panies. After all, many wholly foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges al-
ready enjoy their country’s more favorable corporate tax rate. A variable
was also included to reflect the actual tax rate of the country in which a
company was incorporated. For instance, if a company incorporated in
the United States during a certain year, the observation for Tax Rate
would be coded as “35” for the 35% in taxes that most U.S. corporations
pay annually. The inclusion of the Tax Rate provides for more accuracy
than a dummy variable for inversions. But it should be noted that despite
the Tax Rate’s inclusion, a specific variable for Inversion is also still nec-
essary. This is due to the fact that inverted companies may receive partic-
ularly harsh treatment by politicians and commentators and must expend
significant company resources to invert.225 So although Inversion and Tax
Rate capture similar effects, they are also substantially different, but both
are critically important.
This study also controlled for a statistical quirk with powerful effects on
analysis. In certain circumstances, independent variables have an interac-
tive effect when ideally they would be completely independent of each
222. See Dammann, supra note 171, at 450-51 (discussing the defensive measures
against hostile takeovers available under foreign law).
223. The variable for Corporate Tax Rate was drawn from information supplied by
KPMG. Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG, https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/
tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html (last visited Jan.
13, 2016) (The data goes back only to 2006. Because corporate tax rates are generally
static, the 2006 value was imputed onto the prior years.).
224. See Coyle, supra note 158, at 1942 (mentioning that most commentators intuitively
believe that tax rates attract company relocation decisions, though some studies cast doubt
on how strong of an effect taxes actually have).
225. See Fleisher, supra note 39 (discussing the government costs on a transaction); Kim
& Oran, supra note 205 (suggesting that law firms who structure these inversion transac-
tions receive large fees for their services).
2016] Irrational Investors and the Corporate Inversion Puzzle 485
other. Here, one of the potentially problematic relationships was between
inversions and corporate governance. Recall that inversions require a
company to reincorporate abroad, where it becomes amenable to that
country’s corporate governance laws. But it is likely that investors have a
special reaction when a company invests in a country with porous corpo-
rate governance laws, as opposed to the company initially being head-
quartered and incorporated in a weak corporate governance country. Or,
likewise, investors may react particularly favorably to a company that in-
verts in a place with strong corporate governance and low taxes. This re-
action may be greater than either of those two elements independently.
This methodological quirk was mitigated using an interactive variable,
which entailed multiplying the Inversion variable with the Corporate
Governance variable. The interactive variable’s effect helps both Corpo-
rate Governance and Inversion display their true effect, while also indicat-
ing the statistical significance of the possible interaction. Similarly, there
was an expected interaction variable for corporate tax rate and corporate
governance.
Spurious correlations cause another problem, which happen when two
variables appear related when, in fact, they are not. Spurious relation-
ships are common when research fails to account for other variables that
are actually driving the relationship.226 To avoid this error, an analysis
should account for certain variables that prior research has determined to
affect firm value. If the key independent variables prove to be statistically
significant, even when factoring in the control variables, then there can be
a high level of confidence with respect to the results. The first control
variable is a company’s Size, which was measured by the log of a com-
pany’s total assets. Other salient control variables included a company’s
Free Cash Flow and Return on Assets. A company’s Capital Expenditures
was measured by the ratio of a company’s capital expenditures to assets.
Similarly, a variable is included for a company’s Research and Develop-
ment, which was also taken as a ratio to its assets.
The second model is a probit analysis using many of the same vari-
ables.227 A probit model is appropriate when the dependent variable is,
like Inversion, binary. By making Inversion the dependent variable, the
analysis sought to determine which countries firms actually tend to invest
in. Although the first model endeavors to explain how the regulatory
choices available through different inversion homes affects firm value, it
was also imperative to determine whether the inversion process is actu-
ally structured, in general, to help or harm shareholders. By using a de-
pendent variable of Inversion, it is possible to determine where exactly
firms migrate. For instance, if Corporate Governance is positive and sig-
nificant, this result would indicate that inverted firms are more likely to
226. See, e.g., Alissa Pollitz Worden et al., A Patchwork of Policies: Justice, Due Pro-
cess, and Public Defense Across American States, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1423, 1436-37 (2011)
(ameliorating a spurious relationship using control variables).
227. See Table 2, infra Appendix.
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adopt stronger corporate governance schemes upon inverting. Likewise
almost assuredly Corporate Tax Rate will be negative because it is nearly
impossible for an inverted firm to relocate to a jurisdiction with a higher
corporate tax rate than the United States.
B. RESULTS
The results of the models suggest a shocking result: investors care
deeply about the law. In fact, investors seem to take a rather nuanced
approach to investing. Nearly all of the study’s variables proved to be
statistically significant at greater than .001% level, meaning that the odds
a variable is causally related to Firm Value is greater than 99.9%. We can
infer that, instead of being merely correlated, the study’s independent
variables are very likely causally related to firm value.
In the OLS analysis,228 the first important result concerned the non-
interactive Inversion variable, which was statistically significant in the
second OLS model but insignificant in the first. Inversion’s insignificance
may at first blush seem odd, but it makes perfect sense considering the
other control variable, Corporate Tax Rate. Indeed, the major advantage
that investors gain from inverting is a reduced corporate tax rate.229 Be-
cause this study controls for Corporate Tax Rate, the tax benefits of Inver-
sion are captured by another, more nuanced variable, cannibalizing
Inversion’s demonstrated effect. Notice, however, that in Table 1’s second
model, which excludes Corporate Tax Rate, Inversion is positive and neg-
ative. So by controlling for a company’s tax rate, it seems that investors
are generally interested in inversions to the degree that the transaction
modifies a company’s tax rate, but an inversion’s independent effect is
less significant. Thus, while investors prefer lower corporate taxes, they
do not necessarily care about the type of transactions bringing about this
result. And since the first model already controls for Corporate Tax Rate,
Inversion primarily captures only the stigma and costs associated with in-
verting, which were negligible.
However, there is one salient caveat; the interactive variable Inver-
sion*Corporate Governance was positive and significant. This suggests
that there is a special positive relationship between inversions and corpo-
rate governance. When a company inverts into a country with stronger
corporate governance laws, firm value increased. If investors were unable
to distinguish between a new inversion home’s corporate governance
structures, this variable would have been statistically insignificant. So
while investors appear to generally care little about the actual inversion
transaction beyond its tax savings, investors do reward inverting firms
when they strengthen the regulatory systems under which they operate,
while simultaneously lowering taxes. This result suggests that investors
228. See Table 1, infra Appendix.
229. See Kim & Oran, supra note 204.
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take a rather nuanced stance with respect to, not just whether a company
inverts, but how it inverts.
As expected, Corporate Governance was significant and positively re-
lated to Firm Value. Unsurprisingly, this finding indicates that investors
care about the corporate governance structures under which companies
operate. The stronger the laws, and thus investor protections, the more
likely individuals will invest in that company, which bolsters firm value.
Again, this result is not revolutionary but rather conforms to most prior
research.230
Likewise, note that the interaction between corporate governance and
corporate tax (Corporate Governance*Tax) is highly significant and nega-
tive. It makes sense that, all things being equal, investors favor companies
paying fewer taxes (and thus the negative coefficient) in a stronger corpo-
rate governance regime. So in the aggregate, it seems that companies that
pay lower taxes, while providing strong shareholder protections, are val-
ued higher than other companies.
The aforementioned results have been primarily concerned with an in-
version’s consequences on tax and corporate governance, but other sali-
ent regulatory effects are implicated as well. As discussed earlier, foreign
incorporated companies are often eligible for the less burdensome set of
U.S. securities laws, though a company gaining FPI status has a greater
potential of harming shareholders.231 Firm Value was typically bolstered
by a company’s status as an FPI unless the company was actually head-
quartered in the United States. This aligns with expectations. Foreign
headquartered/incorporated companies should naturally pursue FPI sta-
tus since this arrangement is the natural incentive structure offered by
U.S. securities policy. And in accordance with the literature, foreign firms
that “bind” themselves to the strength and reputation of American secur-
ities laws receive added value.232 American corporations, however, ap-
pear more unscrupulous when they migrate countries by potentially using
an inversion with the hopes of evading certain U.S. securities laws. In
other words, while the lesser U.S. securities laws improve a wholly for-
eign firm’s value, U.S.-based companies are penalized by investors for
avoiding stronger U.S. securities laws. Indeed, the logic of this result fur-
ther indicates that investors and shareholders have a strong understand-
ing of the relationship between companies and regulatory systems, and
thus likely invest in inverted firms accordingly.
230. Gompers et. al., supra note 219, at 125.
231. See Shnitser, supra note 177 at 1652-54.
232. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 674 (1999) (describ-
ing the “bonding” phenomenon in which a firm incorporated in a country with weaker
securities laws goes public in the United States in order to signal to investors the com-
pany’s dedication to transparency by assuming the United States’ more taxing securities
laws); see also Craig Doidge et al.,, Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more?, 71
J. FIN. ECON. 205, 207 (2004) (“We argue that cross-listing helps controlling shareholders
commit to limit their expropriation from minority shareholders and increases the ability of
firms to take advantage of growth opportunities.”).
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The research also controlled for whether a firm was both Foreign incor-
porated and headquartered. Potentially legitimate or even xenophobic
concerns may cause investors to avoid or reluctantly invest in non-Ameri-
can companies. Or perhaps U.S. investors wish to support American com-
panies in order to promote American employees, products, and research
and development. The Foreign variable did, in fact, prove significant and
negative, meaning that, all things considered, investors and shareholders
prefer American-based corporations traded on a U.S. stock exchange.
Adding to the strength of the OLS regression’s results is that all of the
control variables—i.e., variables which the literature has previously es-
tablished as being meaningful related to firm value—were significant.
Naturally companies with strong Research and Development aided Firm
Value. Likewise, Free Cash Flow, Capital Expenditures, and Leverage bol-
stered a company’s value, while Size and Return on Assets detracted.
These findings are reinforced by the probit analysis where Inversion is
the dependent variable.233 Here, Corporate Tax Rate was significant and
negative, meaning that inverted firms flock to countries with lower tax
rates; but considering that the United States’ standing as having the high-
est corporate tax rate, an opposite finding would have likely been impos-
sible. Importantly, Corporate Governance was positive and significant,
indicating that inverted firms are more likely to relocate to countries with
strong corporate governance structures. This is a particularly insightful
finding because it refutes the prior assumption that management-friendly
governance structures attract more inversions. But with that said, al-
though the analysis suggests that a stronger corporate governance struc-
ture improves the chances of inverting, it does not indicate whether a
company’s corporate governance regime is weaker than its former U.S.
structure. Inverted companies are also less likely to become a Foreign
Private Issuer, indicating that inverted firms are generally restrained from
unraveling regulatory protections during and after the inversion process.
So, in conclusion, inverted firms are likely to migrate to countries with
strong rules of law, despite the thought that companies would likely try to
engage in regulatory-stripping transactions.
VI. IMPLICATIONS, POLICIES, AND SUGGESTIONS
Section V’s empirical analysis has important implications for corporate
law’s development. Importantly, the findings are not just theoretical, they
underlie several policy suggestions. The first finding concerns the Arti-
cle’s primary inquiry: are investors and shareholders acting rationally
when they approve, or consent to, corporate inversions?
A. INVESTOR RATIONALITY?
The results help to advance the debate between traditional and behav-
ioral economics literature by demonstrating how these two frameworks
233. See Table 2 infra Appendix.
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should optimally coexist. The manner in which individuals perceive and
respond to corporate and business laws lies at the center of the inversion
puzzle. Although the above statistical treatment provides important in-
sights, one’s conclusions must be tempered. On the surface, the study sug-
gests that investors are quite rational, considering that firm value tends to
drop when a company engages in regulatory-stripping transactions, while
rising when improving shareholder rights and protections. Although the
inclination is that most individuals lack time and sophistication, which
prevents them from engaging in exhaustive research, this ignores the role
of institutional investors who exercise savvy and expend resources when
navigating the market.234 Because most retail investors piggyback onto
institutional investors, even by simply relying upon publicly available
stock prices, investor behavior appears to be, economically speaking,
rational.235
Applying these results to inversions, individuals likely support inverted
companies because of the heterogeneity of inversion transactions. Recall
that inversions have many moving parts, all of which affect the wisdom of
inverting from both a shareholder and director standpoint. It thus makes
plenty of sense why Ireland is a common inversion destination; not only
does Ireland offer a low corporate tax rate, its corporate government
structure protects shareholders.236 While the Mylan case study and simi-
lar examples may cast doubt on whether investors understand the regula-
tory dangers of inverting, shareholders tend to understand the
importance of tax, corporate governance, securities, and antitrust laws—
and invest accordingly.
But a bit of a puzzle remains. If investors generally act rationally, why,
on certain occasions, do investors still consent to head-scratching transac-
tions? Recall the research found in Section V, why did Mylan’s share-
holders overwhelmingly approve the company’s Dutch inversion in light
of the dangers found in Dutch corporate law? Also, for example, why did
investors rush to invest in the Chinese company Alibaba, which recently
executed a series of transactions intended to avoid meaningful regula-
tions?237 Indeed, when Alibaba sought to go public, the company created
a Cayman Islands shell company (the Shell), contracted the Shell to re-
ceive Alibaba’s profits, and then placed the Shell’s securities on the New
York Stock Exchange.238 If either Alibaba or the Shell were to breach
234. See Cartwright, supra note 118, at 1099.
235. Id. (mentioning that retail investors tend to invest through institutional investors
due to their resources and sophistication).
236. Ireland not only offers one of the lowest corporate governance rates of any devel-
oped countries, Ireland also scored the highest on GMI Rating’s corporate governance
scale. See Kim & Oran, supra note 204.
237. Carlos Tejada, U.S. Report Casts Doubt on Legal Structure of Alibaba, Other Chi-
nese Firms, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 20, 2014, 4:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-report-
casts-doubt-on-chinese-e-commerce-legal-structure-1403257238.
238. David Riedel, Four Reasons to Avoid the Alibaba IPO, FORBES.COM (Sept. 15,
2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2014/09/15/four-reasons-to-avoid-the-alibaba-
ipo/; Charles Clover, Alibaba IPO shows foreign investors able to skirt restrictions, FIN.
TIMES (May 7, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a8c4816-d5df-11e3-a017-
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this contract, Chinese and Cayman Islands laws would likely not provide
shareholders with a remedy.239 In fact, commentators suggest that
Alibaba selected the NYSE to take advantage of the exchange’s relaxed
foreign private issuer rules.240 Indeed both the London and Hong Kong
exchanges would have forbidden the manner in which Alibaba’s majority
voting power is vested in a small group of minority shareholders.241 De-
spite these warning signs, Alibaba recorded the most lucrative IPO in
history, raising more capital than any prior offering.242 So how can we
harmonize this Article’s results that emphasize investor rationality with
anecdotal evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion?
Inversions seem to put traditional economics and behavioral economics
in their proper places. First, consider that despite the modern popularity
of behavioral economics, actors generally weigh the regulatory costs and
benefits of a transaction, resulting in thoughtful decision-making.243 This
means the deleterious consequences predicted by behavioral economics
are not nearly as predominant as they may appear. Although behavioral
economics does accurately describe certain pathologically hardwired cog-
nitive problems, these phenomena are likely to exist on the error term.
Although traditional economics has superior explanatory power, rational-
ity escapes even the most sophisticated institutional investors on some
occasions and for some reason. This leads to self-defeating herd behavior.
This is also precisely how traditional and behavioral economics should
relate; while traditional economics better explains the majority of market
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=UK#axzz3ZkcPMeFL (explaining the “variable interest
entity” was created with the purpose of allowing foreigners to own a stake in Chinese
internet companies without actually owning a share).
239. See generally Serena Y. Shi, Dragon’s House of Cards: Perils of Investing in Varia-
ble Interest Entities Domiciled in the People’s Republic of China and Listed in the United
States, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265, 1296-1300 (2014); see also Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Alibaba Investors Will Buy a Risky Corporate Structure, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2014), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/i-p-o-revives-debate-over-a-chinese-structure/?_r=0
(noting that Cayman Islands law requires investors to pursue a remedy under Chinese law.
However, investors may be unable to enforce their contractual rights under Chinese law,
especially considering that the VIE arrangement may be illegal.).
240. Frequently Asked Questions About Foreign Private Issuers, MORRISON & FOERS-
TER, http://www.mofo.com/generalcontent/aboutus/overview (last visited Apr. 8, 2016)
(mentioning some of the disclosure requirements from which foreign private issuers are
excluded).
241. Liz Hoffman & Telis Demos, Easier Rules Lure Foreign Firms to List in U.S.,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/article_email/SB1000142405270230402
6304579449702968537802-lMyQjAxMTA1MDEwMjExNDIyWj?cb=logged
0.8587873768992722 (“Unlike venues in London and Hong Kong, their main rivals in the
race for global listings, the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market allow
corporate insiders who collectively own less than half their company’s stock to exercise
control through dual-share structures and other means. In addition, many foreign compa-
nies are exempted from some of the disclosure requirements imposed on U.S.
corporations.”).
242. Liyan Chen et al., Alibaba Claims Title for Largest Global IPO Ever with Extra
Share Sales, FORBES.COM (Sept. 22, 2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/22/
alibaba-claims-title-for-largest-global-ipo-ever-with-extra-share-sales/.
243. See supra Section II.
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events, behavioral economics fills in the gaps.244 Behavioral economics is
thus not meant to be a stand-alone guiding principal for all economic
behavior, but rather, a means to explain anomalous situations where ra-
tionality has gone missing. If behavioral economics were able to describe
economics and investor behavior as a whole, the market would resemble
chaos. Thus, the key is determining when scholars should look to behav-
ioral economics for help.
B. WHAT TO DO ABOUT INVERSIONS?
There has been plenty of discussion and hand wringing about proper
policy responses to the inversion trend. Inversions ostensibly harm two
different spheres of actors: investors and the public at large. With respect
to the former actors, corporate and business laws are generally meant to
protect individuals, such as shareholders and investors, who may invest or
have invested in a company.245 However, the research herein, indicates
that individuals likely do not need protection—at least from potentially
harmful inversions. After all, the companies most likely to invert are
large multinational corporations that have a predominant shareholder
base of institutional investors. These sophisticated investors spend sub-
stantial resources that retail investors typically follow along with, as the
expenditures result in thoughtful decision-making.246 So in light of the
societal and private costs of public regulations, it is likely that investors
do not need statutory inversion protections from corporate inversions.
However, the public may be a different story. The harm inverting com-
panies inflict on the United States includes erosion of the tax base and
stranding international capital.247 But how much momentum the inver-
sion trend is generating may be a bit overstated. Considering the rules
limiting an inversion’s merger partners and locations, many companies
are likely to find inverting less profitable and desirable than commonly
thought.248 After all, an inversion requires the consent of both directors
and shareholders who often have diverging preferences. Because of this
collective action problem, the amount of economically feasible inversions
that would appeal to both sets of actors is rather slim. This is likely due to
the much-publicized size of the Allergan inversion and Mylan’s soap op-
era. Thus, the inversion trend seems more popular than in actuality. So if
policymakers endeavor to completely eradicate inversions, the best solu-
tions would entail allowing firms to repatriate foreign held capital with-
out suffering the U.S. corporate tax rate,249 or even lowering the
244. Accord John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 149, 187-88 (2015) (explaining the limitations of behavioral economics in the
antitrust context).
245. See Daines, supra note 206 at 526.
246. See Section V’s Empirical Analysis.
247. See Hiltzik, supra note 216.
248. See Raice & Hoffman, supra note 87.
249. Zahrt, supra note 13, at 1612-14.
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corporate tax rate,250 but the lost revenue generated by these strategies
may outpace what could be saved by tolerating a handful of future
inversions.
C. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE LAWS
Another area of contribution concerns the international competition
for corporate charters. There used to be little question about the corpo-
rate laws and regulatory systems with which a company would comply.
Traditionally, American companies incorporated in the United States,
went public on the New York Stock Exchange, and then paid their taxes
to federal and state authorities.251 European and other international com-
panies operated similarly by abiding by their home jurisdictions’ business
laws.252 In fact, unlike U.S. companies, European firms traditionally
lacked an incorporation choice and thus, were forced to incorporate
under their home country’s laws.253
This landscape radically changed when the European Court overturned
the old seat of incorporation rule, which granted European firms the free-
dom to incorporate in foreign jurisdictions.254 Those rulings flooded the
international market with European firms searching for places in which
to incorporate. A number of countries responded by manipulating and
marketing their regulatory statutes in hopes of attracting drifting firms,
their business segments, and corporate charters.255 Due to this sea of
change, modern companies now view regulatory structures as options and
simply choose the bodies of law that best fit their needs.256 For instance,
companies are able to consider a number of countries when making the
250. Id. at 1614-15.
251. See Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2008) (noting that traditionally the U.S. federal government
and the SEC had a monopoly over American securities offerings).
252. Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1727
(2006) (“Unlike American states, most members states in the European Union have long-
followed the so-called real-seat rule, which prevents companies operating in these member
states from incorporating abroad.”); See also Brummer, supra note 152, at 1450-51 (noting
that most countries traditionally went public on their local stock exchange in the absence
of any global competition for securities offerings).
253. See Kamar, supra note 252, at 1727.
254. See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. In-
spire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155; Case C-208/00, U¨berseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co.
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9919; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v.
Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459; Kane & Rock, supra note 5, at 1230-31
(mentioning that the European Court of Justice granted European corporations the free-
dom to incorporate in foreign countries in a series of rulings).
255. See, e.g., Brummer, supra note 152, at 1438 (finding that countries can attract com-
panies using their securities law because “stock exchanges are increasingly poised to oper-
ate as sellers of both domestic and foreign law”).
256. Fleischer, supra note 39, at 238 (explaining that transactional lawyers often struc-
ture deals to exploit the advantages of certain bodies of law over another jurisdiction’s
laws, creating what is known as “regulatory arbitrage”). See, e.g., Omri Marian, Jurisdiction
to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1614-15 (2013) (noting that tax law is often
viewed as a choice: “corporate tax residence is elective. Taxpayers can arrange the tax
residence of corporations as they see fit, and avoid taxes.”).
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incorporation decision257 and when going public; IPO options often in-
clude the London and Hong Kong stock exchanges, as well as some de-
veloping securities markets.258 Even established companies are becoming
increasingly likely to switch to the laws of a foreign nation.259 For in-
stance, the bank HSBC has openly discussed abandoning London due to
the United Kingdom’s costly regulatory regimes in favor of Hong Kong’s
more promising treatment.260
Debate exists over whether the enactment and enforcement of business
laws to attract international companies actually resembles a race to the
top or bottom.261 Although both camps agree that the decision of where
to incorporate is strategic, the argument centers on whether firms migrate
towards national regulatory systems increasing shareholder value—race
to the top—or whether companies prefer jurisdictions that protect man-
agement – race to the bottom.262 According to this camp, evidence sup-
porting the race to the top arguments can be found in the strength of
Delaware’s corporate regime, which one study found increases firm
value.263 In other words, jurisdictions can best compete against Dela-
ware’s corporate dominance by enacting laws that promote shareholder
interests, which in turn have the effect of increasing firm value.
However, race to the bottom advocates note that since the party most
often tasked with orchestrating corporate transactions is management,
firms are most attracted to countries that shield directors and officers
from shareholder lawsuits, hostile takeovers, and other similar actions,
even though these policies are likely to harm company value.264 Consider
the state of Nevada, for example, which has sought to compete against
Delaware by eliminating director liability.265 Instead of encouraging re-
sponsible management, Nevada has determined that the best way to at-
tract firms is to instill decidedly pro-management policies.266
While both of these theories appear anecdotally persuasive and inter-
nally logical, the above research suggests that the race to the top advo-
cates might be correct.267 The statistical study indicates that investors and
257. Kane & Rock, supra note 5, at 1230-31.
258. See generally Nicholas Calcina Howson & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Reverse Cross-
Listings—The Coming Race to List in Emerging Markets and an Enhanced Understanding
of Classical Bonding, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 607, 624 (2014).
259. See The Rise of Corporate Inversions, KELLOGG INSIGHT (Apr. 6, 2015), http://
insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/blogs/entry/the-rise-of-corporate-inversions/.
260. Mike Bird, HSBC should ditch London for Hong Kong is ‘logical place’ to go, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/hsbc-should-ditch-london-and-
hong-kong-is-the-logical-place-to-go-2015-4.
261. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
262. Id.
263. Daines, supra note 205, at 527-28.
264. See Eric Kades, Freezing the Company Charter, 79 N.C. L. REV. 111, 114-15
(2000).
265. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Ju-
risdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 938-45 (explaining how Nevada redrafted its corporate gov-
ernance laws to immunize directors from even legitimate malfeasance claims).
266. Id.
267. See discussion supra Section V.
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shareholders rationally understand and respond to corporate regulations.
Consider the finding that firms pursuing regulatory-stripping transactions
quickly lose value, while the corollary increases it. Since shareholders
must approve an effective inversion, as well as most other significant cor-
porate structure changes, investors are likely to reject a fundamentally
counterproductive transaction.268 This contention is backed by commen-
tators who note that most shareholder actions are fronted by savvy insti-
tutional investors.269 So although management designs corporate
transactions, regulatory-stripping efforts are unlikely to be efficacious,
since shareholders should likely block them. Because the empirical re-
sults indicate that investors and shareholders respond rationally to inver-
sions and other regulatory changing transactions, a country’s best strategy
to attract corporate charters and business is to enact and promote share-
holder friendly, value-adding laws.
CONCLUSION
Recent popular and scholarly writings have intensely scrutinized the
inversion trend. Most of these articles have focused on the desire of com-
panies to erode the U.S. tax base, while a few others have noted their
effects on corporate governance schemes. Less noticed is how these trans-
actions affect a few other regulatory frameworks, including securities and
antitrust laws. Indeed, the United States is notorious for enforcing partic-
ularly burdensome regulatory regimes, adding costs and cumber to the
process of running a company. In this light, most accounts suggest that
foreign migrations make sense because corporate directors benefit by
having to comply with less rigorous regulations.
But it is often lost that corporate migrations are significantly more puz-
zling when considering the preferences of shareholders. Shareholders
should value the law, as expressed through their investing behaviors. In-
vestors and shareholders should thus disfavor inversions and other inter-
national transactions that diminish their rights and protections. After all,
regulatory frameworks are generally thought to benefit shareholders and
investors, which corporate migrations seem to undermine. Considering
this framework, shareholders should refuse to consent to corporate mi-
grations and individuals should disfavor investing in inverted companies.
Whether these observed investor behaviors are surprising depends
upon the body of literature to which one subscribes. The traditional
framework suggests that investors are rational and consider all aspects of
a company before investing. Under this framework, corporate migrations
appear odd since shareholders should understand and value regulatory
frameworks, while acting accordingly. The more popular theory comes
from behavioral economics which suggests that people are poor investors.
268. See Talley, supra note 2, at 1686.
269. See generally Jennifer O’Hare, Retail Investor Remedies Under Rule 10B-5, 76 U.
CIN. L. REV. 521, 533-35 (2008) (describing the relationship between and investing behav-
iors of sophisticated institutional investors and retail investors).
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More specifically, psychological limitations hamper the ways in which in-
dividuals approach the market, causing investors to overvalue, under-
value, or even ignore certain salient factors. Under this framework, the
seemingly irrational support that shareholders have given to inversions is
more understandable. A goal of this Article is to compare and test these
competing accounts.
The empirical results of this Article suggest that investors do consider
the law thoughtfully and rationally. Most regulatory eroding behaviors
appear to diminish firm value while strong legal regimes add to a firm’s
worth. The key to these findings is that the international regulatory envi-
ronment is quite complex. Investors do enjoy the value gained from a
lower tax rate but only as long as the company reincorporates in a juris-
diction with, as an example, a comparably strong corporate governance
statute.
However, the research herein does not attempt to answer why Mylan’s
shareholders, or other similarly situated investors, consented to a specific
inversion or other tax-driven migration. In fact, in light of the research,
Mylan’s inversion is even more perplexing and should serve as a caution-
ary tale. Shareholders certainly found themselves in a precarious situa-
tion where they had few tools available under Dutch law to contest their
board’s value-reducing actions, especially compared to American law.
But this is likely where the strength of behavioral economics lies. While it
does not necessarily describe investor behaviors as a whole, it does ex-
plain why in certain situations even sophisticated institutional investors
seem to make pathologically poor decisions.







Corporate Governance .0109591 -.1029418***
(.0124581) (.0061237)
Foreign Private Issuer .2291396*** .23837***
(.0135029) (.0134807)










Return on Assets -.0200587*** -.0201077***
(.0014112) (.0014119)
Capital Expenditures .0418541*** .0418774***
(.0028936) (.002895)
R & D .0060696*** .0060779***
(.0003356) (.0003357)






Number of Observations 113,392 113,392
R-Squared 0.2789*** 0.2782***
Probability > F
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 0 0




Corporate Governance .74794*** .7339372***
(.0378266) (.0375532)
Foreign Private Issuer -.4283961***
(.0940136)






Return on Assets 1.798085** 1.855655**
(.9147356) (.9115454)
Capital Expenditures -1.756337* -1.813343**
(.901389) (.89826)
R & D .0038795 .0038765
(.0050802) (.0051233)
Free Cash Flow -1.796318** -1.853902**
(.914722 ) (.9115324)
Constant 1.604346*** -5.955259***
Number of Observations 127,590 127,590
Pseudo R2 0.4274*** 0.4204***
Probability > F
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 0 0
498 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
